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JUDGING JENA’S D.A.: THE PROSECUTOR AND RACIAL ESTEEM 
 
By Andrew E. Taslitz* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 This article uses the views of the Jena 6 prosecutor, Reed Walters, concerning the 
justifications for his role in the Jena 6 affair, as a foil for exploring the proper role of prosecutors 
more generally in our system of justice.1 Walters favors a traditional prosecutor-as-advocate role 
that is focused on the individual case. That role ignores how each such case harms the social 
esteem of the suspect’s racial group.  
  A better conception of the prosecutor’s role would thus recognize his part in this economy of 
racial disesteem. Understanding Reed Walters’ flawed vision and the superiority of its esteem-
attentive alternative first requires, however, a brief review of the background to his decisions in 
the Jena 6 case. 
 A. Who are the Jena 6? 
  1. Background 
   The plight of the Jena 6 has recently made headlines throughout the nation, even 
leading to a congressional hearing on the subject.2 The term, the “Jena 6,” refers to six African-
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1
 See Reed Walters, Justice in Jena, N.Y. TIMES, September 26, 2007, A27. 
2
 See, e.g., Abbey Brown, All White Jury Selected for First “Jena Six” Trial; No Minorities Report for Jury Duty, 
THE TOWN TALK (June 27, 2007); Black Teen Guilty of Battery in Racially Charged La. Case, WASH. POST, June 
29, 2007, at A14; Arian Campo-Flores & Grefe C. Kovach, A Town in  Turmoil, NEWSWEEK 36 (August 20,2007); 
 2 
American students at Jena High School in Jena, Louisiana who were expelled from school and 
charged with attempted second degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder for what the 
students’ supporters have called a “school yard brawl.”3 Five of the Jena 6 were juveniles at the 
time of the assault, though the prosecutor chose to proceed against the one student thus far tried 
and convicted, Mychal Bell, as an adult, the transfer to adult court having been done without a 
hearing.4 Bell was ultimately convicted of the new charges of aggravated second-degree battery, 
conspiracy, and attempted second-degree battery after the complaint was amended to add those 
charges and delete the attempted murder-related ones—still exposing Bell to a maximum 
potential prison sentence of twenty-two-and-a-half years.5 Although Louisiana’s appellate courts 
ultimately sent Bell’s case back to juvenile court, a major victory for Bell, he was nevertheless 
                                                                                                                                                       
Farai Chideya, Searching for Justice in Jena 6 Case, NPR’s News & Notes (aired July 5,2007); Mary Foster, Race is 
Talk of Small Louisiana Town, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 5, 2007); Howard Witt, Racial Demons Rear Head in 
School Beating Case, CHICAGO TRIBUNE June 29,2007), available at 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-elf2ulmmay20,1,3301167.story (last visited September 
10,2007); Noose Hate Crime Act, H.R. 6777, 110th Cong. (2008); S. Res. 396, 110th Cong. (2007) 
3
 See sources cited supra note 2; Walters, supra note 1, at A27 (Jena prosecutor’s trying to rebut descriptions of the 
events by commentators as a “a schoolyard fight,’ as it has been commonly described in the news media and by 
critics”). 
4
 See Abbey Brown, Jury Unanimously Convicts First “Jena 6” Teen to Face Trial, LA GANNETT NEWS (June 29, 
2007); Jesse Muhammed, Jena 6: Young Black Males the Target of Small-town Racism, BALTIMORE TIMES (July 25, 
2007), available at http://www.btimes.comNews/article/article.asp?News ID = 13762 & 5 ID = 3(last visited 
September 10,2007). The Jena 6 teens were originally arrested and charged with aggravated second-degree battery, 
but, on December 11, 2006, the prosecutor amended the charges to attempted second-degree murder and conspiracy 
to commit second-degree murder.  See Supplemental Motion for a New Trial, Louisiana v. Bell, No. 82112, 1 (28th 
Jud. Dist. Ct. Lasalle Parish, La., Sept. 4, 2007).  On the eve of Bell’s trial, prosecutor Reed Walters again amended 
his complaint, this time charging Bell again with aggravated second-degree battery and conspiracy to commit 
aggravated second-degree battery.  See Supp. Motion for a New Trial, supra, at 1; Justice for the Jena 6: Take 
Action Now!!! http://www.snopes.com/politics/crime/jena6.asp (last visited August 2007) [hereinafter Justice for the 
Jena 6].  Second-degree murder is a charge for which a juvenile over the age of fifteen must be tried in adult court 
upon return of an indictment or a finding of probable cause that the offense was committed.  LA Code, Art. 305A.  
But the juvenile procedures transfer statute says nothing about mandatory transfer of attempted second-degree 
murder.  However, the statute does grant the prosecutor discretion whether to seek transfer to adult court of 
attempted second-degree murder or a second or subsequent aggravated battery but not of attempted aggravated 
second-degree battery.  LA. Code, Art. 305B.  Neither provision permits transfer solely on conspiracy charges.  See 
also Motion in Arrest of Judgment, La v. Bell, No. 82112 (filed August 27, 2007). The late reduction of the charges 
may, therefore, have created the appearance of charge-manipulation by the prosecutor to empower him to seek trial 
in adult court.  Cf. Memorandum in Support of Motion in Arrest of Judgment, La. V. Bell, No. 82112, 5-6 (field 
August 27,2007) (making analogous argument).  These observations explain why I say that the prosecutor “chose” 
to proceed in adult court rather than that he was required to do so. 
5
 See Supplemental Motion for a New Trial, supra note 4, at 1. 
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sentenced to an 18-month term as a juvenile.6 The five remaining members of the Jena 6 still 
await trial. 
  2. The “White Tree” 
   To opponents of the prosecution, the plight of the Jena 6 is but one of the most overt 
recent examples of the usually more covert but routine racial disparities in the administration of 
American criminal justice.7 Jena High is a mostly white school, and the schoolyard violence in 
question may have stemmed from a dispute over the “white tree,” a large oak tree under which 
only white students sat.8 A black student had asked and received a school official’s permission to 
sit under the tree.9 Shortly thereafter, students and school authorities found three hangman’s 
nooses dangling from the tree. Several black students responded by sitting under the tree, leading 
to scuffles, followed by a school assembly at which local prosecutor, Reed Walters, spoke.10 At 
this assembly, Walters allegedly said, specifically to the black students, “I can be your friend or 
                                               
6
 Mychal Bell of ‘Jena 6’ ordered to juvenile facility, CNN, Oct. 12, 2007, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/law/10/11/bell.jail/index.html; Judge Ousted for Remarks, CHI. TRIBUNE, Aug. 2, 
2008, at 4. 
7
 See Tom Mangold, “Stealth Racism” Stalks Deep South, BBC NEWS (May 24, 2007), available at 
http://news.bbc.couk/2/hi/programmer/this_world/6685441.stm (last visited September 10, 2007); Bill Quigley, 
Injustice in Jena as Nooses Hang from the “White Tree,” COUNTER CURRENTS (July 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.countercurrents.org/quigley030707.htm (last visited September 10, 2007); Sherrel Wheeler Stewart, 
Supporters of the Jena 6 Gather 43,000 Signatures of Petition, Rally Calling for Equal Justice, BLACK AMERICA 
WEB (July 31, 2007), available at http://blackamericaweb.com/site.aspx/bawnews/jenasix731 (last visited September 
12, 2007). For websites and blogs devoted heavily to Jena 6, see, e.g., Free the Jena 6 (a coalition effort), 
http://www.freethejena6.org; Friends of Justice, http://friendsofjustice.wordpress.com/jena-6; ACLU on Jena, 
www.aclu.org/racialjustice/racial/profiling/31880res20070917.html; Color of Change, 
http://colorofchange.org/jena/main.html; Davey D’s Hip Hop Blog, http://bloc.myspace.com/mrdaveyd. 
8
 See Justice for the Jena 6, supra note 4; Quigley, supra note 7. 
9
 See Justice for the Jena 6, supra note 4; Quigley, supra note 7. 
10
 See Quigley, supra note 7; Amy Goodman, “Modern-Day Lynching” —Parents of Jena Six Speak of Injustice, 
Racism in Sons’ Prosecution, DEMOCRACY NOW (July 10, 2007), available at 
http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=07/07/10/1413228 (last visited September 10, 2007); Darrel Fears, La 
Town Fells “White Tree,” But Tension Runs Deep; Black Teens’ Case Intensifies Racial Issues. WASH. POST, 
August 4, 2007, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article2007/08/03/AR2007080302098.html?nav=emailpage (last visited September 10, 2007). 
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your worst enemy. I can end your lives [and/or make your lives disappear] with the stroke of a 
pen.”11 
 In the ensuing months, school officials put Jena High on lockdown, its main academic 
building thereafter burning down in what investigators deemed an act of arson.12 The school 
principal had recommended that the three white students found to have hung the nooses be 
expelled, but the school board reduced the punishment to a three-days-long suspension.13 
Meanwhile, when Robert Bailey, who would later become one of the Jena 6, sought to attend a 
party, a white male attacked Bailey. The Jena prosecutor charged Bailey’s assailant with simple 
battery, his sentence mere probation.14 The very next day, when Bailey and some of his friends 
entered a grocery store, a white man named Matt Windham grabbed a shotgun from his truck, 
purportedly to use on Bailey.15 Bailey and his friends wrestled the gun away from Windham and 
took it to the police, reporting the incident. However, to their surprise, authorities charged 
Windham’s black victims, not the white Windham, with robbery and assault for the theft of the 
firearm.16 
  3. The “Schoolyard Brawl” 
   Only two days after the shotgun incident, the school fight that led to charges against 
the Jena 6 broke out at Jena High. This fight resulted in a white student, Justin Barker, being 
knocked unconscious, and treated at the local hospital for a concussion, a swollen eye, and a 
                                               
11
 See Wade Goodwyn, Beating Charges Split La. Town Along Racial Lines, NPR’S ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (aired 
July 30, 2007), transcript available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyid=12353776 (last visited 
September 16, 2007); Mike Taibbi, In Depth; Racial Divide in Jena, Louisiana, NBC NIGHTLY NEWS (aired July 31, 
2007); Goodman, supra note 10. 
12
 See Justice for the Jena 6, supra note 10. 
13
 See id. 
14
 See id. (describing the incident); Richard G. Jones, Injustice in Jena? A tree, a fight, and questions of justice in a 
small Louisiana town, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at 10.. 
15
 See Justice for the Jena 6, supra note 4 (describing the incident); Jason Whitlock, Jena 6 case caught up in 
whirlwind of distortion, opportunism, KAN. CITY STAR, .Sep. 30, 2007.  
16
 See Justice for the Jena 6, supra note 4. [Note: Remember to say these were all allegations]. 
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number of cuts and bruises.17 The hospital released him after two hours, and he purportedly 
attended a class-ring ceremony that evening.18 Witnesses conflict over who started the fight and 
whether some of the Jena 6 were even involved.19 Authorities eventually charged Barker with 
possessing a firearm in an arms-free zone for bringing a loaded rifle to Jena High, but the courts 
released him on $5000 bond.20 Police arrested the Jena 6, however, for the assault on Barker. 
 Authorities first charged the Jena 6 with aggravated second-degree battery, with the 
complaint later being amended to include the charges of second-degree murder and conspiracy to 
commit second-degree murder.21 The courts ordered bond imposed on each of the Jena 6, 
ranging from a low of $70,000 to a high of $138,000, a sharp contrast to Barker’s relatively 
meager bond.22 
 Bell’s conviction as an adult left him facing a potential sentence of 22 years in prison.23 His 
trial counsel, according to his supporters, was ineffective, failing, among other things, to call 
witnesses in Bell’s defense, to question or object to many jurors who admitted having formed 
                                               
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 John Ydstie, ‘Jena 6’ Case Exposes Town’s Racial Tensions, NPR: TALK OF THE NATION (aired Sept. 102007). . 
20
 Key dates surrounding the ‘Jena 6’, THE SHREVEPORT TIMES (LA.), Sep. 10, 2008, available at 
http://uspolitics.about.com/gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.shreveporttimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article%3FA
ID=/99999999/NEWS01/70921001. 
21
 See supra note 4. 
22
 See Justice for the Jena 6, supra note 4.  Bell’s high bond purportedly resulted from his having a prior juvenile 
conviction arising from a December 25, 2005 battery, then facing juvenile charges arising from three other incidents 
purportedly connected to the Jena noose-hangings but while Bell was still on probation for the first offense.  See 
Prosecutor: “Jena Six” Defendant Had Four Juvenile Convictions, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, August 25, 2007; Abbey 
Brown, “Jena Six,” Defendant’s Criminal History Comes to Light; Bond Denied, THE SHREVEPORT TIMES (August 
25, 2007), available at 
http://www.shreveporttimes.com/apps/pbcs.d1/article?Date=20070825&Category=NEWS03&ArtNo=708250353&t
emplate=printart (last visited September 10, 2007). State and federal prosecutors investigating the case concluded, 
however, that the assault on Barker was unconnected to the noose-hanging incident.  See Justice for the Jena 6, 
supra note 4, though the media, protestors, and many students and parents reached very different conclusions.  See 
generally Jena 6, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jena_Six (serving as a compendium of public views on the case, if not 
necessarily a recounting of whatever the true events may have been). 
23
 See supra note 5. 
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prejudgments about the case, and to make serious protests to assure diversity on what turned out 
to be an all white jury.24  
 The lenient treatment of the white students contrasted sharply with the harsh treatment of the 
black students on a wide range of matters:  the severity of the charges; the size of the bond; the 
length of the sentences sought; and the venue in adult versus juvenile court versus mere intra-
school discipline. These apparent racial disparities ensured that prosecutor Reed Walters would 
find himself under fire. 
 B. What Was the Prosecutor’s Vision of His Ethical Obligations? 
 Walters published an op-ed piece in several leading national newspapers defending his 
actions in the case.25 He argued that the law prohibited him from bringing hate crimes charges 
against the white students who hung the nooses on the tree, while the law correspondingly 
required him to proceed against the black students, particularly Mychall Bell, as adults, seeking 
extremely harsh punishments.26 Other writers have challenged the accuracy of his legal 
analysis.27 But this piece will be far more concerned with the conception of the prosecutor’s 
professional role, specifically concerning the racial impact of prosecutorial statements, policies, 
and actions embodied in the Jena prosecutor’s letter—even assuming its assertions’ accuracy. 
 The Jena prosecutor’s vision of his professional role is to be bound by the “letter” of the law 
—a position that assumes that there is always such a crystal clear “letter” to be found and that his 
job is to resolve each case before him in isolation, ignoring whether it is part of a pattern of 
related cases, whether it sends destructive social messages, and whether it furthers “equal” 
                                               
24
 See Supplemental Motion for a New Trial, supra note 4. 
25
 See Walters, supra note 1. 
26
 See id. 
27Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQUETTE L. REV. 85, 119 n. 165 (2007). 
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justice in society as a whole.28 In short, this is a narrow, technical conception of the prosecutor’s 
role that, this piece will argue, embodies a form of willful ignorance inconsistent with empirical 
realities, relevant psychological theories, the evolving recognition of a very different social role 
for the prosecutor, and the most normatively desirable vision of that role. 
 C. An Alternative Vision of the Prosecutor’s Role 
  The alternative vision of the prosecutor that this piece will defend is rooted in the idea of 
the “economy of esteem”.29 “Esteem,” as I use the word here, is a comparative attitude of 
approval of a person or group’s actions or dispositions for which observers conclude the person 
or group may fairly be held responsible. Because esteem evaluations are comparative, they are 
scarce, so individuals and groups compete for esteem.30 They do so, in the language of economist 
Geoffrey Brennan and philosopher Philip Pettit, by competing for “esteem services”–providing 
or “purchasing” services that increase your esteem or decrease that of your competitor.31 This 
                                               
28
 Thus, Walters said: 
 
 I can understand the emotions generated by the juxtaposition of the noose incident with 
the attack on Mr. Barker and the outcomes for the perpetrators of each.  In the final analysis, 
though, I am bound to enforce the laws of Louisiana, as they exist today, not as they might in 
someone’s vision of a perfect world. 
 
 That is what I have done.  And that is what I must continue to do. 
 
Walters, supra note 1. Walters also described himself as a “small-town lawyer and prosecutor” whose job for 16 
years has been “to review each criminal case brought to me by the police department or sheriff, match the facts to 
any applicable laws, and seek justice for those who have been harmed.”  Id. Walters thus portrayed himself as 
straightjacketed by clear and absolute law, as if he had no discretion, thus no responsibility. While noting that the 
courts ultimately sent Bell’s case back to juvenile courts, Walters saw no need therefore to re-think his charging 
decisions or his responsibilities—and even to admit the possibility of error.  He specifically distanced himself from 
the question whether “America needs a new civil rights movement,” focusing the bulk of his op-ed piece on why he 
thought Bells’ alleged crime a heinous one and why he could not charge the noose-hangers with a hate crime given 
the facts of the two cases.  See id..  He devoted not one word to whether he should have considered the impact of his 
decisions in the Jena 6 case on the local and national African-American communities, on inter-racial conflict, on the 
perceptions and reality of governmental legitimacy, on likely future crimes by others in these various communities, 
on the educational culture at Jena High, on the racial culture in the town of Jena itself, or even on the rehabilitation 
of all the teenagers in the varied Jena High incidents. 
29
 See generally GEOFFREY BRENNAN & PHILIP PETTIT, THE ECONOMY OF ESTEEM (2004) (first articulating a theory 
of the esteem economy). 
30
 See id. at 15-23 (defining “esteem”). 
31
 See id. at at 55-62 (describing “esteem services”). 
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competition will often occur subconsciously, permitting consciously truthful denials of the self-
interested reasons for your actions.32 There are at least three broad types of esteem service 
strategies: (1) performance strategies – behaving in ways that you believe will raise your esteem 
in the eyes of the relevant audience; (2) publicity strategies – expanding the audience aware of 
your purportedly esteem-enhancing activities and dispositions while shrinking the audience 
aware of the opposite; and (3) attempting to alter the standards for, dimensions of, and 
comparators for judging esteem in the relevant social sphere.33 Esteem brings strong 
psychological rewards of its own as well as enhancing access to money, power, education, and a 
wide array of other resources.34  Just as there is an esteem economy, so is there a disesteem 
economy in which some persons or groups demand services that will impose disesteem on other 
persons or groups.35 
 One of the major sources of esteem valuation and competition, centers upon race. Racial 
membership can bring esteem or disesteem, and one’s race can alter how that individual is 
judged by certain observers, who may understand the same actions differently when engaged in 
by someone of one race versus another.36 The prosecutor’s social role is in part to assist in 
imposing disesteem on those convicted of crimes,—disesteem proportional to the wrong. But the 
prosecutor’s actions will necessarily affect the esteem or disesteem respectively awarded to, or 
imposed upon, racial groups by the prosecutor’s words and deeds. The prosecutor does not, of 
course, act alone, but he can contribute to the economy of esteem in conjunction with other 
psychological and cultural forces and social actors in important ways.  
                                               
32
 See id. at 39-48, 50-55. 
33
 See id. at 68-74. 
34
 See infra Part II at 10-12. 
35
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 223-29, 238. 
36
 See infra Part II for details supporting all the assertions in this paragraph. 
 9 
 The causal chain can work the other way too, with racial esteem affecting how the prosecutor 
interprets individual and group actions. But the prosecutor unavoidably plays a role in the 
economy of racial esteem, the impacts of his actions are often foreseeable, and his own self-
deception is capable of being overcome. He is, therefore, morally responsible for his actions in 
the economy of racial esteem. His “duty to do justice” is widely recognized to encompass at least 
ensuring procedural fairness to the individual, something he cannot do if blinded by esteem-
colored glasses, but that duty must be broadened to recognize the broader social impacts of his 
actions.37 
 Prosecutors have many tools at their disposal for promoting racial esteem or disesteem. What 
charges they seek, what tactics they use in guilty plea negotiations, what publicity they give to a 
crime are but a few of those tools.  
 Jena’s economy of racial esteem in miniature offers a perfect opportunity to explore the 
prosecutor’s role in that economy. This article will take advantage of that opportunity. The 
article will also suggest alternative ethical models for prosecutors to follow to minimize the harm 
that they currently wreak in such an economy while maximizing the social gains of visiting 
proportional disesteem upon individual wrongdoers rather than upon their racial groups.  
 D. A Roadmap to Esteem 
 Part II explains what “esteem” is and how it can operate in a world of market exchange.  Part 
IIA and B examines as well how the esteem economy can affect the fate of both individuals and 
groups, most of the work of the esteem economy being done at the level of the unconscious. 
 Part IIC first explores the special role of racial disesteem and offers an overview of how the 
law can alter operation of the racial disesteem market for good or ill.  Next, Part III explores in 
                                               
37
 See generally Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics as Usual, 2003 ILL. L. REV. 1573 (2003) (arguing that 
prosecutors’ duty to “seek justice” should give rise to a host of obligations not shared by other lawyers - and 
insufficiently recognized in existing ethical codes). 
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detail the primary means by which well-meaning prosecutors can tilt the esteem economy 
harshly against minority racial groups.  Part III explores in particular the prosecutors’ role in the 
charging decision, what I call the “pricing” decision in plea bargaining, and in anti-defendant 
publicity—a role that controls raced social norms, regulates the standards for esteem-allocation, 
and denies procedural justice.  For each of these actions, Part III explores the potential harms 
prosecutors can inflict by ignoring group esteem and disesteem. 
 Part IV compares the traditionally understood role of the prosecutor with an evolving one. 
Several trends contribute to the evolution of this new role, specifically the development of five 
new prosecutorial functions: the preventative, healing, procedural justice, unconscious non-
adversarial, and accuracy functions.  This new model requires prosecutors to consider the impact 
of their choices on the economy of racial disesteem and to act to minimize its harmful effects. 
 Part V suggests solutions to the problem, including analyzing how Jena 6 prosecutor Reed 
Walters could have handled the case differently.  
 Part VI concludes the piece with a summing up and an eye toward the future. 
II. THE ECONOMY OF ESTEEM 
 A. Defining Terms 
  Esteem is a comparative attitude of approval of a person or group’s actions or 
dispositions for which observers conclude that the person or group may fairly be held 
responsible.38 Although esteem is an attitude, not an action, it is linked to action because esteem 
stems from one’s performance on some good characteristic. Esteem must thus be earned.39  
                                               
38
 See BRENNAN& PETTIT, supra note 29, at 15-23. 
39
 See id. at 16-17. 
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Furthermore, esteem, though bestowed based upon actions, is often seen as revealing of a deeper 
character trait, that is, of a virtuous nature.40 
 For example, a professor’s volunteering to spend extra time tutoring students struggling in 
his course may be esteemed by his students as a “kind” or “caring” professor.41  It is not simply 
his kind action that students value, but his kind nature, as revealed by that action. For the 
professor to be esteemed on this trait, however, it is not enough that he be seen as caring; he 
must, rather, be seen as more caring than most other professors in the institution, for esteem is by 
definition a comparative concept. Someone who is esteemed for many actions and qualities by 
varied audiences is “widely esteemed,” benefitting from a more general approval than esteem 
achieved on one or two characteristics.42 The same professor would, therefore, be widely 
esteemed if much of the student body—including students who had not seen him teach—as well 
as his colleagues, school administrators, alumni, and members of professional organizations 
considered him an all-around excellent teacher, scholar, and community servant. 
 Because esteem is comparative, it requires some understanding of average performance.43 
The absence of esteem occurs, therefore, if others view someone as but an average achiever.44 
                                               
40
 Brennan and Pettit put it this way: 
 
If I esteem someone positively I will do so for their being kind or fair, brave or bold, a good 
parent, a conscientious colleague….And if I disesteem someone I will do so for their being 
cruel or unjust, cowardly or snide, an uncaring parent or a sloppy colleague…. 
 
Id. at 17. For an explanation of how and why we readily make character judgments (general judgments about 
someone’s disposition to think or act in a certain way across some specified range of situations), see Andrew E. 
Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV. 1, 89-91 
(1993). 
41
 The example is mine.  Brennan and Pettit notably identify at least three dimensions on which esteem may be 
bestowed: (1) “standard” properties that may be shared by all persons, such as cowardice or bravery; (2) “positional” 
properties, where esteem turns on one’s ranking in an explicit or implicit competition within an organization, such as 
the most or least honest employee in a company or the persons coming in first and last in a race; and (3) “sortal” 
properties, turning on a person’s social role, for example, as a “kind nurse, an honest politician, a corrupt 
accountant….” BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 17 (emphasis added).  My example is of the last, “sortal”, 
kind. 
42
 See id. at 17 n. l. 
43
 See id. at 69, 92-94. 
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“Disesteem” occurs whenever someone is seen as being above average on a negative trait.45 To 
say someone is a “cruel” person is thus at least to say that he shows a more active willingness to, 
and joy in, harming others than do most people. But being seen as below average on a positive 
trait may or may not lead to disesteem, the rating being revealed in the audience’s word choice.  
Thus to call someone “brave” is high praise, but the absence of that descriptor does not 
necessarily make that person a “coward”—a stinging disesteem-imposing description.46  The 
absence of bravery may simply mean you have average fortitude in the face of danger, or 
perhaps that you are a tad below average but still not deserving of disapprobation. On the other 
hand, someone who cares nothing for other people—he is simply indifferent to them and their 
suffering—is not likely to be described as “cruel.” But he may be described as “indifferent,” 
“cold,” or “uncaring”—words of mild insult, albeit not to so great a degree as embodied in the 
idea of cruelty.47 
 Status is esteem’s close cousin. High social status is, of course, valued and inheres in some 
audience’s attitude toward the person observed.  Moreover, status is also a comparative 
concept—one’s status existing only relative to others.48 But status need not be seen as earned. A 
wealthy person may have high social status in some quarters merely by virtue of being wealthy, 
even if all his or her wealth was inherited.49 Esteem requires more: the belief that the person 
                                                                                                                                                       
44
 This point seems implicit in the idea that esteem and disesteem are assigned relative to an average or zero point, 
though Brennan and Pettit do not clearly say so.  See id. at 17-18 (discussing zero point idea on an esteem/disesteem 
scale), 69, 92-94 (discussing average performance). 
45
 See id. at 17-18. 
46
 Cf. id. (using analogous examples). 
47
 On the negative moral implications of ascribing “indifference” to another, see Andrew E. Taslitz, Hate Crimes, 
Free Speech, and the Contract of Mutual Indifference, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1283, 1290 (2000). 
48
 See MICHAEL MARMOT, THE STATUS SYNDROME: HOW SOCIAL STANDING AFFECTS OUR HEALTH AND 
LONGEVITY 1, 11 (2004) (defining status as “[w]here you stand in the social hierarchy”). 
49
 See id. at 15 (noting that income and one’s parents’ social class are important determinants of status; parents’ 
social class at a child’s birth, I note, is logically independent from whether the newborn child has yet done anything 
to deserve his good fortune). This distinction between some forms of status as unearned is mine, not being addressed 
by Brennan and Pettit.  Indeed, they sometimes conflate “status” with “esteem.” See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 
29, 1. 
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deserved his or her good fortune, earning it by her hard work or superior skills.50 In practice, 
however, the distinction between status and esteem can be a fuzzy one.  Thus, in a capitalist, 
highly individualist country like ours that is steeped in the Protestant work ethic, the wealthy 
inheritor’s money may trace its roots back to an ancestor who did earn it.51 Mere association with 
that ancestor may give his descendant a kind of reflected esteem.52 For this and similar reasons, 
words like “status,” “honor,” and “esteem” are often used interchangeably, generally without any 
loss in clarity of expression.53   
 Esteem must also be distinguished from reputation. “Reputation” consists of what many 
others in a certain community say about an individual’s performance in a particular field of 
endeavor.54 Esteem, however, is an attitude held by audience members, whether or not 
communicated to others or acted upon by them.55 Some audience members might believe in the 
truth of a person’s good reputation, holding him in high esteem, but others might reject his 
reputation as undeserved.56 Nevertheless, reputation can have an important influence on esteem, 
so a good reputation is highly desired, a bad one to be avoided.57 
                                               
50
 See supra text accompanying notes 38-47 (defining “esteem”). 
51
 Cf. DE BOTTON, supra note 48, at vii (“[S]tatus in the West…has been awarded in relation to financial 
achievement.”), 181 (“Because societies are in practice trusted to be ‘meritocratic,’ financial achievements are 
necessarily understood to be ‘deserved.’” The ability to accumulate wealth is prized as proof of the presence of at 
least four cardinal virtues: creativity, courage, intelligence, and stamina.”). 
52
 Cf. MARMOT, supra note 49, at 15 (just having parents of high social class brings the child status). 
53
 See DE BOTTON, supra note 48, at 182-83 (using “honour” and “status” interchangeably); BRENNAN & PETTIT, 
supra note 29, at 24 (collecting as illustrating esteem’s value a variety of quotes that also use phrases like 
“reputation,” “honour,” and “glory”). 
54
 See STEVEN FRIEDLAND, PAUL BERGMAN, & ANDREW E. TASLITZ, EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE 103 - 08 (3d 
ed. 2007) (defining “reputation”). 
55
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 15 (“[E]steem…involves an attitude, not an action, and…it may or may 
not be expressed in praise or criticism). 
56
 See id. at 27-28 (esteem can be “in fact defective”), 147-48 (noting possibility of attaining high esteem— “fame” - 
- though there is no provable basis for deserving it), 226 (esteem varies with who is do doing the evaluating so that, 
for example, countercultural groups face disesteem from the broader society but esteem from the rebels); Taslitz, 
Myself Alone, supra note 40, at 104 -08 (explaining the potential inaccuracies of reputation); FRIEDLAND, ET AL, 
supra note 55, at 89, 138 (analyzing credibility of reputation witnesses). 
57
 See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Duke Lacrosse Players and the Media: Why the Fair Trial/Free Press Paradigm 
Doesn’t Cut It Anymore, in RACE TO INJUSTICE: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DUKE LACROSSE PLAYERS RAPE 
CASE 1, 5-7 (forthcoming 2007) (draft manuscript). (summarizing reputation’s value); BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra 
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 Esteem is valued by those who hold it for both instrumental and inherent reasons. Those 
holding us in high esteem trust us, increasing the chances that they will aid our endeavors and 
seek closer relationships with us.58 Closer relationships themselves bring material benefits, 
perhaps in job or educational opportunities.59 Like social status, high esteem also brings political 
power, longer lives, better health, and more resource-rich mates.60 Those holding high status or 
esteem receive the deference of those lower on the totem pole, are perceived as more competent 
and credible, and gain more speaking time and attention in public settings.61 They are thus more 
effective persuaders, leading to further snowballing of their access to money, psychic 
satisfaction, and power. 62 
 But esteem is valued as of inherent worth too.63 The inherent psychic value of esteem is so 
great that, for example, some professors might sacrifice money and family peace to accept an 
offer to teach at another but more prestigious institution in a godforsaken corner of the country.  
They will do so merely to receive the enhanced esteem from being associated with the new 
                                                                                                                                                       
note 29, at 3-4, 30-31, 197-200 (distinguishing reputation from esteem, largely viewing the former as a competitive 
tool or “service” for achieving the latter, while simultaneously critiquing other economists’ unduly narrow 
understanding of reputation’s meaning and value). 
58
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 26 (noting esteem-trust connection and resulting relationship 
advantage). 
59
 See ABRAHAM TUCKER, THE LIGHT OF NATURE PURSUED 188 (1834) (“[W]e find it so extremely and continually 
useful to have the good opinion and esteem of others, which makes them friendly and obsequious to our desire, that 
this is enough to give us a liking to esteem, and consequently to those actions or qualities tending to promote it.”); cf 
ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 112 (1999) , (discussing material benefits of high 
status). 
60
 . Cf. TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 60, at 112 (“High status may also bring…more access to money, 
jobs, and political power.”); MARMOT, supra note 49, at 1-12 154-58, (arguing higher social status - - independent of 
other factors - - leads to longer, healthier lives); and that low social status norms marriageability); BRENNAN & 
PETTIT, supra note 29, at 26 (noting that another instrumental benefit of enjoying the esteem of those whom you 
esteem is providing you with grounds to think well of yourself too). 
61
 Cf. TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 60, at 69-74 (defending similar point concerning gendered status). 
62
 See id. at 111-13. 
63
 Compare BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 29 (arguing esteem has intrinsic value); with DE BOTTON, supra 
note 48, at vii (summarizing instrumental value of high social status as including “resources, freedom, space, 
comfort, time and, as importantly perhaps, a sense of being cared for and thought valuable—conveyed through 
invitations, flattery, laughter (even when the joke lacked bite), deference and attention.”). 
 15 
academic home.64 Albeit often in somewhat different language, commentators from ancient 
Greece to modern times—including Cicero, Aquinas, Hobbes, Locke, Voltaire, Hume, Kant, and 
John Adams—have sung esteem’s praises.65  Philosopher Adam Smith put the point thus: 
Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original 
desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught 
him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable, regard.  
She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for 
its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive.66  
 
Modern disciplines as diverse as neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and behavioral and bio-
economics confirm the factual accuracy of Smith’s position.67 It is important to remember that 
Smith spoke of “unfavourable regard” too—of disesteem.  Disesteem is, however, esteem’s 
mirror, bringing just the opposite ill consequences to esteem’s positive ones.68 
                                               
64
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 71 (using similar example). 
65
 See id. at 24-25. 
66
 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 116 (1769) (Liberty Classics ed. 1982). 
67
 Brennan and Pettit argue that biology probably explains why esteem has inherent, not solely instrumental, value 
for human beings: 
 
 But there is evidence that to some extent esteem also has an intrinsic or unconditional 
hold on us, being something that nature has primed human beings to find attractive, perhaps 
for reasons of biological fitness. We often care about esteem where there is little or nothing to 
be gained in pragmatic or evidentiary terms.  We care about our standing among people we 
are unlikely to meet—say, those who come after us—and among people who know so little 
about us that their opinions can hardly give evidentiary support to our view of ourselves. 
 
BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 29.  See also Roy F. Baumeister & M. R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire 
for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 497 (1995) 
(psychological evidence of the central value of esteem in humans); cf. DONALD W. PFAFF, THE NEUROSCIENCE OF 
FAIR PLAY: WHY WE (USUALLY) FOLLOW THE GOLDEN RULE 61-79, 99-120 (2007) (arguing that there is a 
biological basis for the Golden Rule rooted in our ability to view ourselves as connected to others and nurtured by 
reciprocal social relationships of mutual care and concern).  
68
 Cf. DE BOTTON, supra note 48, at vii-viii (noting that a “status anxiety” about lost, potentially losing, or low status 
can give us the sense of being stripped of human dignity and respect; leaves us in constant worry that our status 
hangs in the balance should we fail to achieve; and, from failure, brings humiliation, “a corroding awareness that we 
have been unable to convince the world of our value and are henceforth condemned to consider the successful with 
bitter and ourselves with shame.”); MARMOT, supra note 49, at 1-12 (noting low social status causes ill health); 
TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 60, at 69-75, 136-37, 141-45 (noting ill effects of low social status of 
women in the context of sexual assault).  Although achieving equal esteem for all is likely impossible, especially if 
the imperative for comparative status and esteem has biological roots, there still may be ways to minimize the ill or 
unfair consequences of esteem/disesteem inequalities.  Marmot, for example, posits that low status harms health and 
life-span because it decreases autonomy (the sense of control over the direction of our lives) and social integration 
(of connectedness to others).  See MARMOT, supra note 49, at 11, 158-63.  Marmot concedes, however, that status 
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 B. How the Economy of Esteem Works: Basic Model 
  Given esteem’s being widely desired but scarce—scarce because esteem is a comparative 
ranking system in which not everyone can be on top—there is always an effective demand for 
it.69 “Effective” demand means that individuals are willing to pay some price in time, money, or 
other resources to attain a desired level of esteem.70 Individuals will vary in how much they are 
willing to pay for what degree of esteem, but everyone is willing to pay something.71 
 Esteem-seeking can be overt or virtual, conscious or unconscious.72 Thus someone seeking to 
prove himself his generation’s greatest mathematician can nakedly seek esteem among his 
colleagues, earning it by doing and publicizing brilliant work.  
But this overt strategy is not viable for anyone who seeks to be esteemed for virtuous character 
traits.  A person who is believed to act kindly, though not because he cares about others but 
solely to achieve public praise for his behavior will be little esteemed.  (He will still have some 
                                                                                                                                                       
inequalities will always be with us but argues that social institutions can be modified so that low status does not 
translate into minimal autonomy and high social isolation.  See id. at 240-57.  Professor Robert Fuller, the former 
President of Oberlin College, concedes that power differences cannot be eliminated, and what he calls “rank 
differences” closely “reflect power differences.” See ROBERT W. FULLER, SOMEBODIES AND NOBODIES: 
OVERCOMING THE ABUSE OF RANK 4 (2003). But abuses of rank—using power differences “as an excuse to abuse, 
humiliate, exploit, and subjugate”—he insists, is a social ill that can be cured. Id. at 4.  Indeed, he maintains, 
accurate ranking based on fair standards and limited solely to the domain in which an individual performs—and not 
extending to his entire character and life—is a social good essential to economic efficiency, electoral choice, and 
political legitimacy.  See id. at 15-16.  Yet just this sort of global ranking occurs when race becomes the basis for 
judging value.  The ranking is factually defective—race does not determine individual performance or value—and is 
normatively defective—an unacceptable standard of judgment in a society purportedly constitutionally committed to 
the fundamental equality of individuals.  Cf. infra text accompanying notes 101 -04 (defending the principle under 
the rubric of “esteem”). Furthermore, esteem—based on perceived performance—differs from recognition or 
respect, that is, from treating others in a way that recognizes the fundamental equality in certain crucial respects of 
all humans.  Cf. BRENNAN & PETTIT¸ supra note 29, at 20, 23, 33, 154, 179, 185-90, 192, 194, 237; Andrew E. 
Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 27 -28  (2003) (defining “respect”). 
Humans doing evil deeds deserve “disesteem” but never “disrespect.”  See infra text accompanying notes 192 - 95. 
69
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, 
70
 See id. at 34. 
71
 See id. at 35 (“[S]ocial esteem is something that everyone desires, and how much esteem people receive depends 
upon how they perform in this or that domain.”).  This observation does not mean, however, that “effective” demand 
therefore arises in the usual sense of that term, but it does arise often in an analogous, “virtual” sense of demand.  
See id. at 35; infra text accompanying notes 80 - 81. 
72
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 36-49. 
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esteem, for we prefer good behavior to bad.)73  His heart and hand must be seen as in synch for 
him to be thought of as a good person.74  Where they are not in synch, his actions seem 
deceptive; he is just “playing” at virtue. 75 Explains seventeenth-century French moralist, Jean de 
la Bruyere:  
At heart men wish to be esteemed, and they carefully conceal this because 
they wish to pass for virtuous, and because desire to gain from virtue any 
advantage beyond itself would not be to be virtuous but to love esteem and 
praise—in other words, to be vain.  Men are very vain, and they hate 
nothing so much as being regarded as vain.76 
 
 This conundrum is resolved by “virtual” demand for esteem. 77 A person may, therefore, 
overtly target a particular behavior for reasons other than gaining esteem,78 say, volunteering to 
head a charitable fundraising drive for curing juvenile cancers because of a sincere love for 
children.  But if that behavior brings him esteem, he is more likely to do more of it, more 
effectively and enthusiastically. Esteem-bestowal serves as a reward.  On the other hand, if he 
chooses another behavior, say, competing in beer-guzzling contests because he likes getting 
drunk, disesteem for these actions among his co-workers, family, and church members will 
inhibit future drinking.  Disesteem serves as a punishment. Each person can, therefore, demand 
more esteem by engaging in actions that bring it, thus indirectly or “virtually” demanding 
esteem. 
 But human beings usually act from multiple, often mixed motives.79  The person who 
volunteers fundraiser to cure juvenile cancers may thus act both from a love of children and of 
                                               
73
 Cf. Id. at 36-37 (making similar point using different examples). 
74
 See id. at 38. 
75
 See id. at 37-38. 
76
 A.O. LOVEJOY, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN NATURE 144 (1961) (quoting de la Bruyere). 
77
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 40-46. 
78
 See id. 
79
 See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?: Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9 DUKE J. GENDER & L. 1, 30 -49 (2002); Andrew E. Taslitz, Willfully Blinded: On 
Date Rape and Self-Deception, 28 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 381, 423- 34 (2005) [hereinafter “Willfully Blinded”]. 
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esteem.  Yet the more that he is seen to be acting to gain praise, the less of it he will receive.80  
Furthermore, sincerity is hard to fake.81  Self-deception—driving your true motivations into the 
less conscious or even the unconscious realms of your mind—makes your consciously-
articulated motives seem sincere ones, so appearing to both you and your observers.82  Indeed, 
there is strong evidence that self-deception evolved precisely to enhance individuals’ 
effectiveness at other-deception.83  For this reason, much of the demand for esteem may occur 
unconsciously. 
 The supply of esteem is likewise complex.  Because esteem is an attitude, would-be suppliers 
cannot choose to manufacture esteem.  They can offer esteem only to those they see as earning 
it.84  Nor can the benefits of esteem or the costs of supplying it be captured fully by any 
supplier—the old problem of externalities.85  If A feels and expresses esteem for B, and if A’s 
words persuade others, thus catching fire, then B might become widely and highly esteemed.  
This benefits B the most, but does not benefit A apart from the satisfaction that A derives from 
sincerely esteeming B. A’s incentives for supplying esteem to B are consequently small.  Esteem 
cannot, therefore, be directly produced for a price upon demand, nor can it be directly traded on 
an open market nor expressly bequeathed to heirs.86  Furthermore, for esteem to confer its 
blessings it must also seem sincere, so any supplier having mixed motivations for holding and 
                                               
80
 See supra text accompanying notes 70 -75 (explaining why the demand for esteem as to character traits must be 
virtual); BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 48 (noting that persons seen even partly to be displaying character 
virtues for the purpose of gaining esteem will “as a result…not attain quite the level of esteem that would accrue to 
more saintly counterparts.”). 
81
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 39 (noting pure deception as means of concealing a conscious desire for 
esteem is likely a failing strategy). 
82
 See Taslitz, Willfully Blinded, supra note 79, at 424 - 34. 
83
 See id. at 393 - 98. 
84
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 52. 
85
 See id. at 52-55. 
86
 See id. 
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expressing esteem for another must once again hide this truth from himself as well as others.87  
He too must play the game of self-deception. 
 The problem of esteem supply is solved by indirect or virtual trade via “esteem services.”88  
Such services can include agreeing to pay attention to another’s performance, for one cannot 
esteem another for actions of which the former is unaware.89  There is indeed a separate 
economy of attention.90  One way to gain another’s attention is to give it to him, generating an 
instinct for reciprocity.91  Of course, if B nakedly attends to A’s purportedly virtuous behaviors 
solely to gain A’s attention, A may not grant it. A may perhaps resent B as an obvious 
sycophant.92  But if B hides his true motives from himself and thus from A, A will appreciate B’s 
seemingly sincere attentions and reciprocate.93  Furthermore, if A’s attending to B increases A’s 
esteem, A will pay still more attention to B, though A may not fully consciously appreciate why 
he does so.  But if A’s attending to B brings A disesteem, or if B begins to ignore A, A’s 
attention to B will flag and perhaps vanish.94 
 Another sort of esteem service is to “testify” or speak on another’s behalf in an effort to 
enhance the breadth and depth of various audience’s esteem for that other.95  Again, this 
                                               
87
 See supra text accompanying notes 81- 83(concerning need for apparent sincerity of motives for action other than 
esteem-seeking and the role of self-deception in creating this appearance). 
88
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 55. 
89
 See id. at 56. 
90
 See generally, RICHARD A. LANHAM, THE ECONOMICS OF ATTENTION: STYLE AND SUBSTANCE IN THE AGE OF 
INFORMATION (2006) (articulating one theory of an attention economy); MAGGIE JACKSON, DISTRACTED: THE 
EROSION OF ATTENTION AND THE COMING DARK AGE (2008) (analyzing the social and psychological forces that 
erode or promote attention). 
91
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 61-62.  More precisely, Brennan and Pettit argue that, to succeed, 
reciprocity may not be a conscious goal in supplying another with esteem. But if the person whom you esteem does 
not reciprocate, then you will take your esteem-grant elsewhere.  See id. 
92
 See id. at 58 (“But the problem is that my sincerity will always be in question where there is a straightforward 
exchange involved”). 
93
 See id. at 60-61 (noting conscious concealment of esteem-reciprocating-goals is unlikely to succeed, so alternative 
“virtual” concealment strategies are required); Taslitz, Willfully Blinded, supra note 80, at 419-29 (explaining 
personal advantages of self-deception). 
94
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 61-62 (offering examples supporting this point). 
95
 See id. at 56-57. 
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agreement may be conscious and overt or unconscious and virtual.96  If testimony is highly 
effective, it may lead to “common belief” in the other’s virtue—just about everyone thinking 
well of him.97  Common belief can stem from informational cascades in which so many people 
value you that more “choose” to share the belief just because they want to join the bandwagon.98  
Once common belief in virtue is achieved, it is hard (though far from impossible) to dislodge by 
contrary evidence.99  The same is true of fame’s opposite—infamy.100  Indeed, throughout this 
article, it is important to remember that all that I say about esteem applies to disesteem as well, 
though with the incentives often reversed (people generally want less disesteem rather than 
more). 
 There are a variety of strategies in competing for esteem.  A performance-based strategy 
specializes performance in the areas in which one does best and seeks the maximum performance 
level that can be achieved at an acceptable cost.101  A publicity-based strategy aims to publicize 
and positively-categorize a person’s achievements in as large and diverse audiences as is 
feasible.102  Correspondingly, the performer can seek to hide or downplay his failures. 103 A 
related tactic is to aim publicity only at those audiences likely to be receptive to your 
performance.104  Similarly, you can choose to value their opinion above another’s.105  A rabid 
liberal chooses to give a red-meat speech to left-wing Democrats, not equally rabid right-wing 
                                               
96
 See id. at 60-61. 
97
 See id. at 57. 
98
 See id. (making this point); CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC COM. 2.0 84-85, 90-91 (defining “informational 
cascades”).   
99
 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 57. 
100
 See id. (making this point and further noting that “infamy amounts to stigma, as distinct from mere shame….”). 
101
 See id. at 69-70. 
102
 See id. at 70. 
103
 See id. at 70-71. 
104
 See id. at 70 (“[T]hey will want the audience to share a common awareness that their relative merits [but not 
demerits] are recognized”), 142, 204 (analyzing audience choice). 
105
 This observation is an application of virtual reciprocity, discussed supra text accompanying notes 70-75. 
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conservatives. The quality of the audience matters too, the acclaim of the Democratic 
Presidential Convention meaning more than that of a local block captain.106 
 Presentation strategies offer a third option.107  The effort here is to challenge the standards for 
esteem-rankings: what qualities or accomplishments should be valued more than others?  What 
dimensions and persons should be the comparators, and what measurement used to determine the 
average?108  Many law school faculties long had, and perhaps some still have, debates over the 
relative value of teaching versus scholarship. Those professors skilled in both areas likely 
ignored the debate.  But faculty members whose strongest talent by far lay on one side or the 
other of the scholarship/teaching divide engaged in heated, even angry conflicts.109  In a world of 
merit pay, some of this anger was directed more at Deans than other colleagues, an effort to 
compete for scarce pay raises. But my own experience suggests that the depths of passion 
involved stemmed primarily from the desire to persuade faculty and administrators alike to grant 
esteem based more on one dimension than the other.  Combatants on both sides often dismissed 
those highly skilled in both areas as aberrant, not to be counted in computing average versus 
above or below-average performance.  Likewise, debate occurred over what “equivalent” schools 
should be used as comparators and what the standards should be for “good” or “bad” teaching or 
scholarship.  This academic hubbub is one striking example of a set of presentation strategies. 
 The fundamental attribution error helps to explain why contests over esteem can be so 
fierce.110  This error occurs when we explain another’s behavior more by their perceived 
                                               
106
 See id. at 204-08 (analyzing audience quality). 
107
 See id. at 70-71. 
108
 See id. 
109
 See id. at 71 (discussing similar example). 
110
 E.E. JONES, INTERPERSONAL PERCEPTION 138 (1990) (arguing that the fundamental attribution error is the “most 
robust and repeatable finding in social psychology….”). 
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character than by their situation.111  If a colleague is repeatedly late, many of us will attribute it 
to his tardy nature, giving little weight to its more likely true cause: the sleep apnea from which 
he suffers. We assume, on the other hand, that were we in his circumstances, suffering his plight, 
our stronger character would prevail.  We would still be punctual.  Yet if we in fact found 
ourselves in our colleagues’ situation, we would likely explain our resulting lateness more by our 
circumstances than our fundamentally flawed nature.  The error is magnified by our willingness 
to make judgments about others’ character based upon startlingly minimal information and by 
the “halo” and “devil’s horns” effects.112 The halo effect is the tendency to rely on one positive 
trait to obtain an overall positive opinion of a person’s personality, the devil’s horns’ effect being 
the opposite.113  Esteem-enhancing actions often have powerful contributing situational causes: 
the accident of sharing a Battlestar Galactica obsession with a boss, who accordingly offers you 
the opportunity to perform well on increasingly difficult tasks; the church fundraiser you head 
primarily because your spouse insisted you do so; or the unusual heroism you display primarily 
because the person you want to romance is watching when a crisis occurs.  Observers are more 
likely, however, to attribute these achievements respectively to diligence, compassion, and 
bravery rather than to accident.114  Furthermore, even a single observation of relevant behavior 
may be enough to support the observer’s conclusions, and these positive conclusions will tend 
likewise to lead audiences to see the achiever as an all-around good person, at least in the 
absence of contrary evidence.115 
                                               
111
 See id. (describing the error as “the tendency to see behavior as caused by a stable disposition of the actor when it 
can be just as easily explained as a natural response to more than adequate situational pressure.”). 
112
 See Lenese Herbert, Othello Error: Facial Profiling, Privacy, and the Suppression of Dissent, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 79, 119 & n.247 (2007) (defining the “halo” and “devil’s horns” effects). 
113
 See id. at 119 - 20 & n. 247. 
114
 See NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT ACCIDENTS 57-62 (2000) 
(explaining and illustrating the fundamental attribution error). 
115
 See Taslitz, Myself Alone, supra note 40, at 89 -91 (making similar point); BUCHANAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, 
at 74-75 (explaining the role of the fundamental attribution error in an economy of esteem as leading actors and 
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 Social norms—regularities in behavior in society or a group—are also intimately linked to 
patterns of esteem. 116 Norms reflect and embody both attitudes and behavior.117  A norm exists 
only if most persons in a particular society comply with it.118  But a regular behavior is a norm 
only if people generally approve of those complying with it and disapprove of those doing the 
opposite.119  Moreover, the approval or disapproval, whether conscious or not, must partly 
explain the behavior.120  This approval or disapproval manifests itself with strong moral 
overtones, and moral talk plays a role in the rise, fall, and evolution of social norms.121  
Expression of the attitudes here called esteem and disesteem are thus both shaped by norms and 
instantiate them.122  Changing norms can therefore change economies of esteem and vice-
versa.123  The often subconscious trade in the esteem economy; its connection to moralized 
judgments, especially about virtuous versus unvirtuous character; its close inter-relationship with 
                                                                                                                                                       
observers to explain virtuous behavior based on enduring character traits rather than the presence of situations that 
enable actors to obtain esteem). 
116
 See Lynn Stout, Social Norms and Other-Regarding Preferences, in NORMS AND THE LAW 13, 28 (John N. 
Drobak ed. 2006) (noting that, despite disagreement over the definition of social norms, “[t]here seems to be a 
general consensus, however, that norms are rules of behavior that are enforced not by courts but by other forces.”); 
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Our argument will suppose that norms involve patterns of more or less general behaviour that 
materialize in part—that emerge or are stabilized—by virtue of the fact that people generally 
approve or are expected to approve of others displaying that behavioiur, and/or disapprove or 
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 See id. (noting general approval of compliance, disapproval of its opposite, or at least an expectation of both, is 
another necessary definitional aspect of a norm). 
120
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2000). 
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social norms; and its abilities to alter behavioral incentives and to bring material and psychic 
rewards and punishments will all shortly be seen to play critical roles in understanding too-often 
ignored aspects of the criminal justice system and of the prosecutor’s role in it. 
 C. Racial Groups and the Esteem Economy 
  Esteem and disesteem can accrue to groups as well as individuals.124  Some of these 
groups are voluntary, some involuntary.125  It is the involuntary ones on which I want to focus 
here.  Involuntary associations are those for which membership is “thrust upon” members by 
society, there being no individual or collective ability to exit or disband the group and no 
collective veto over membership.126  A person sharing the characteristics defining the group is an 
automatic member.127  Stereotypes, cognitive biases, and cultural narratives define the group 
collectively and its individual members as sharing certain traits and behaviors—traits and 
behaviors associated with fundamental moral qualities.128  These assertions may be conscious or 
unconscious.129  In either case, however, their moral connotations mean that the group and its 
members gain presumptive esteem or suffer disesteem based on group membership.  In the case 
of disesteem, racial minority groups serve as the clearest example.130 
 The United States Supreme Court, speaking both about reputation and esteem, has 
recognized this interactive link between a racial group’s fate and that of its members.  In 
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 See id. at 195-96, 223. 
125
 See id. 
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 See id. at 223-24. 
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 See id. 
128
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121, 124 - 29 (2006) (concerning moral associations triggered in many whites’ minds upon seeing a black face). 
129
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 See id. at 222-29. Brennan and Pettit note that even mere association between esteemed and disesteemed groups’ 
members reduces the former group’s esteem. See BRENNAN & PETIT, supra note 29, at 228. 
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Beauharnais v. Illinois,131 the President of the White Circle League challenged his conviction 
under a criminal statute prohibiting defaming groups of people, arguing that free speech 
guaranteed him the freedom to distribute a pamphlet spewing racial hatred.  Said the pamphlet, 
“if persuasion and the need to prevent the white race from being mongrelized by the Negro will 
not unite us, then the aggressions…—rapes, robberies, knives, guns, and marijuana of the Negro 
surely will.”132  The Supreme Court affirmed Beauharnais’s conviction, rejecting his free speech 
claims, explaining: 
It would, however, be arrant dogmatism, quite outside the scope of our 
authority in passing on the powers of a State, for us to deny that the Illinois 
legislature may warrantably believe that a man’s job and his educational 
opportunities and the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the 
reputation of the racial and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs 
as on his own merits.  This being so, we are precluded from saying that 
speech concededly punishable when immediately directed at individuals 
cannot be outlawed if directed at groups with whose position and esteem in 
society the affiliated individual may be inextricably involved.133 
 
Although Beaucharnais has never been expressly overruled, its current precedential vitality is in 
doubt, but its insight is not.134 
 Disesteemed group members have several options.  Exit is costly and, for racial group 
members, generally impossible.135  One strategy to improve esteem, therefore, is to look to the 
group itself for affirmation rather than to the broader society.136  This can be a positive approach 
if the group accepts broadly-stated societal standards for evaluation but rejects society’s low 
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 See BRENNAN & PETTIT, supra note 29, at 222-23, 226-28. 
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rating of the group as based  upon factual inaccuracies.137  This inner-focused approach can also 
be helpful if the group instead rejects broader evaluative standards, replacing them with reasoned 
and morally-defensible alternatives.138  But the approach can be destructive if it adopts anti-
social standards for awarding esteem, for example, by approving of violence rather than peace, 
theft rather than honesty, ignorance over education.139  Where group members or sub-groups 
choose this last strategy, social disesteem of the group can end up increasing crime.140  
Moreover, this anti-social strategy by sub-group members can feed group stereotypes that are 
attributed to all group members, even if most group members take more positive approaches to 
their plight.141 
 Groups can take more outward-looking approaches as well.  They can seek to publicize 
group members’ accomplishments of which the broader society approves and to hide those of 
which it disapproves.142  Groups and their members can alternatively agitate to change the 
broader societal standards by which they are judged.143  Because esteem is a scarce commodity 
and brings with it money, power, and life satisfaction, any change in the existing group 
distribution of esteem means losses for some, gains for others.  Many of those standing to lose 
will mount counter attacks.144  As noted above, struggles over esteem become struggles over 
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emotionally meaningful symbolism; the existence, meaning, and evolution of social norms; and 
basic principles of social and political morality.145  Because so much is at stake, and because 
collectivities can mount more resources than individuals, struggles waged over esteem by 
disesteemed minorities contending with esteemed majorities can be particularly brutal.146  Once 
again, much of this struggle can be waged unconsciously.147  Because of the law’s power to 
reflect and shape social norms and the central moral role assigned to criminal law in our culture, 
the criminal justice system, and the primary voice of the state in that system—prosecutors—play 
a particularly important role in waging esteem warfare.148  
III. THE PROSECUTOR’S ROLE IN THE ESTEEM ECONOMY 
 A. Criminal Prosecution and (Racial) Disesteem 
  Understanding the prosecutor’s role in the economy of racial esteem first requires 
understanding the criminal justice system’s broader role in that economy.  The key point is that 
the criminal justice system, in theory and in practice, is designed to impose disesteem on 
individuals.  Moreover, the system has the effect of imposing such disesteem on racial minority 
groups, particularly African-Americans, as well. The system imposes disesteem via three 
primary mechanisms:  (1) the speech act of conviction; (2) the expressive function of conviction 
and sentence; and (3) the continuing incapacities facing convicted persons even after serving 
their sentences.149   
  1. Speech Acts 
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   “Speech acts” occur when words themselves are deeds.150  Kent Greenawalt thought 
the phrase “situation-altering utterances” more clearly expressed the idea, defining such 
utterances as a “means for changing the social context in which we live.”151  The legal system is 
filled with such utterances—words that, merely by being spoken or written, and regardless of the 
truth of their content, alter individuals’ legal status and obligations and, thereby, their social 
world.152 
 Consider the marriage ceremony. The priest, rabbi, other religious leader, or magistrate asks 
each member of the couple, “Do you promise to love, honor, and cherish your soon-to-be spouse 
in sickness and in health, in wealth and in poverty, until death do you part?”  So long as a valid 
marriage license has been prepared (itself another speech act), each member of the couple’s 
merely speaking the words “I do” changes their legal status. They are no longer simply “John 
and Mary” but “husband and wife.”153  This change in status occurs even if one or both of them 
was lying—if, for example, the man married the woman solely to gain access to her wealth, 
having no intention of ever loving, honoring, or treasuring her. This new status carries with it a 
wealth of new rights—presumptive joint ownership of property, access to a portion of the other’s 
social security benefits, inheritance rights, and eased access to joint medical insurance benefits 
being but a few of the prominent examples.154  Similarly, the new status carries with it legal 
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obligations, for example, in fault-based divorce states, spouses have the obligation of sexual 
fidelity to one another.155 
 Yet this changed legal status also changes the couple’s social status.  Sexual fidelity to 
spouses, even more than to boyfriends and girlfriends, is a strongly accepted social expectation 
even in states where there is no corresponding legal obligation.156  Parents, grandparents, and 
authority figures more warmly and fully accept the couple.157  Even modernly, children of the 
couple need not fear the ostracism of “bastardy.”158  Indeed, marriage has a secular sacred 
status—one that exists apart from any particular religious belief—in our culture.159  It is a 
symbol of commitment, the making of two individuals into a family.160  This status affects power 
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relationships as well, both between the married partners and between them and the outside 
world.161 Modern marriage, even in an ethos of gender equality, increases the bargaining power 
of each spouse vis-à-vis the other because the costs of exit are higher.162  The enhanced pooled 
economic, psychic, and social resources of marriage increase the couple’s financial and 
psychological security and their ability to compete as a team with life’s challenges.163  For these 
reasons among others, exclusion from the right to marry marks individuals as second class 
citizens deserving social disesteem.164  The struggle between proponents and opponents of gay 
marriage can readily be understood as just such a competition over the social distribution of 
esteem and its opposite.165 
 A criminal conviction can likewise be understood as a negative counterpart to the marriage 
example. An accused felon is nevertheless legally presumed innocent unless and until he is 
convicted.166  But the conviction consists of a single word spoken by the jury foreperson on 
behalf of the jury: “guilty.”167  Only then does the man become a “felon.”168  But this change in 
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status has enormous legal, psychological, and social consequences for the new felon.  He may 
lose many rights, including the rights to vote, to locomote freely, to choose what he will eat and 
when he will sleep, work, travel, pick his social companions.169  He has new and painful 
obligations too: to report to a probation or parole officer, return to a halfway house, submit to 
imprisonment.170  He may be barred from certain jobs, required to register as a “sex offender,” 
compelled to submit to psychological therapy.171  Even if the sentencing judge shows leniency, 
for example, granting probation with few conditions when the law permitted far harsher 
sanctions, the individual’s freedom is then bestowed upon him by the court rather than a right 
upon whose enforcement he may insist.172  But these diminished rights and enhanced obligations 
                                                                                                                                                       
[W]hat is said, what is being done, when the fact-finder brings in a verdict of “Guilty” (or of 
“Not Guilty”)?  When a jury finds that a defendant…did commit the offence charged, its 
finding is just that—a finding that this person committed this offence. But the formal 
declaration of a verdict of “Guilty” in open court by a jury or magistrate or judge does more 
than that: the verdict is not just the assertion of a proposition, but a performative that 
condemns the defendant as a criminal wrongdoer.  Its meaning lies not only in the proposition 
that the defendant committed the crime charged, but also in what is done by this formal 
declaration of guilt—the condemnation of his commission of that crime.  That is why those 
who have been mistakenly or unjustly convicted might reasonably think it is so important to 
try to clear their name - - that they have been unjustly condemned as wrongdoers.  That is 
why for some people a conviction is itself a kind of punishment, indeed a severe punishment: 
they suffer the condemnation of their fellow citizens—a condemnation that can be acutely 
painful. 
3 ANTONY DUFF, ET. AL., THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: TOWARDS A NORMATIVE THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 83 
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mark the felon as other, as outside the community of citizens deserving their full rights. 173 In our 
culture and perhaps most others, this mark will have powerful negative emotional resonance for 
observers.174  The felon’s new status—created by a speech act—brings with it disesteem in the 
larger community.175  Moreover, the criminal law purports to right public, not private, wrongs.176 
The jury’s declaration of the offender’s “felon” status thus labels him a community predator, one 
deserving of disesteem by all who learn of his status.  The speech act, “guilty,” accordingly has 
significant social consequences. New status brings a new reality.   
  2. The Expressive Function 
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 Here is how criminologist Joan Petersilia puts it: 
 
They are back in society but not free.  Under the federal law and the laws of every state, a 
felony conviction has consequences that continue long after a sentence has been served and 
parole has ended. 
 
 Convicted felons may lose many essential rights of citizenship, such as the right to vote 
and to hold public office, and are often restricted in their ability to obtain occupational and 
professional licenses. Their criminal record may also preclude their receiving government 
benefits and retaining parental rights, be grounds for divorce, prevent their serving on a jury, 
and nearly always limits firearm ownership. 
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In the popular view, guilt is not merely a description of behavior but a statement of moral 
quality.  Guilt says something about the quality of the person who did this and has a “sticky,” 
indelible quality. Guilt adheres to a person more or less permanently, with few known 
solvents. A person found guilty of theft becomes a thief, an offender. A person who spends 
time in prison becomes an ex-prisoner, an ex-offender, an ex-con.  This becomes part of his or 
her identity and is difficult to remove. 
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   Fully appreciating how the speech act of a conviction changes an offender’s social 
status requires understanding law’s expressive function: its ability to send messages about right 
and wrong thought, actions, and character—messages often capable of changing behavior, 
hearts, and minds.177  The criminal law’s expressive role is particularly important.178  Scholars 
endlessly debate what should be the purpose of criminal law.179  I will not re-hash these debates 
here, but will simply note that the character-based variant of “communicative retributivism” is 
the theory I find most convincing and which best illustrates the points I want to make here.180 
 Retribution and revenge are close cousins.  Both stem from a similar emotional need: to see 
an offender suffer as a way of restoring the victim’s status in the eyes of the community.181  
When a wrongdoer treats a victim badly, he sends the message that the victim is unworthy of 
better treatment.182  When the state fails to condemn the wrongdoer, the state embraces and 
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policing and punitive practices, for instance, communicate a racial and political, rather than 
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reaffirms that message.183  Through retribution, “the community [instead] corrects the 
wrongdoer’s false message that the victim was less worthy or valuable than the wrongdoer; 
through retribution, the community reasserts the truth of the victim’s value by inflicting a 
publicly visible defeat on the wrongdoer.”184  The tort system contains a retributive component, 
but it is one that permits a more direct infliction of injury upon the defendant for the personal 
wrong he has done the plaintiff.185  Tort-based retribution channels and controls the victim’s 
acting out of his resentment toward a wrongdoer.186  In the criminal context, by contrast, 
retribution is expressed by the community for a public wrong donr to it.187  It is the community’s 
righteous indignation, rather than the victim’s personal resentment, that is channeled to social 
purposes.188  For this reason, a criminal conviction carries an expressive punch that a tort verdict 
does not. 
 Some important distinctions must be made here.  Properly understood, just retribution must 
be proportionate and not demean the individual.189  Most Western liberal theories of rights are 
rooted in a commitment to the equal worth of all persons, or at least of all citizens.190  Theorists 
dispute what quality inheres in equal amounts in all persons, but all agree that some such quality 
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exists.191  That quality entitles all persons to equal respect, partly meaning that all are entitled to 
some minimal set of equal rights.192  To “demean” someone is to treat them as unworthy of such 
equal respect.193  The theory of communicative retributivism rejects any punishment that 
demeans the offender, even if the offender demeaned his victim.194  Indeed, communicative 
retributivists seem generally to be saying that offenders always demean their victims, treating 
them as less than full human beings, requiring a strong message to topple the offenders from 
their unfairly assumed heights of worth relative to their targets.195  But the ultimate aim of 
criminal punishment is to restore equality and no more.196   
 I do not believe, however, that “putting criminals in their place” relative to their victims is 
the only expressive function of criminal law and punishment.  Although all persons have equal 
worth that guarantees them some minimal level of respectful treatment, human beings are not 
equal in all respects, nor will our culture treat them as such.197  In particular, Americans believe 
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in the ideal of getting what you deserve, however much critics may bemoan our failures to live 
up to this aspiration.198  Moreover, Americans see deserving behavior as reflective of a person’s 
fundamental nature.199  Given the criminal law’s expressive, moral educative role in sanctioning 
breaches of society’s most strongly held norms (in the ideal, anyway), behavior seen as 
indicative of core moral dispositions—what psychologists call “personality” traits and folk 
wisdom labels “character”—is of greatest consequence.200  Good moral behavior marks good 
persons meriting rewards; ill behavior marks bad persons deserving punishment.201  Good and 
bad are not dichotomous variables but relative points on a spectrum.202  In other words, criminal 
punishment marks offenders as deserving of various degrees of disesteem, the degree turning on 
the severity of the harm done, the context, and the offender’s state of mind.203  Criminal 
punishment assumes, furthermore, that this mark will change minds: society will in fact embrace 
the attitude of disesteem toward the offender.204   
 This description of our criminal justice system is, I think, an accurate one.  As I have argued 
elsewhere, I also think it is a desirable one.205  I say this with full recognition that it is an 
approach fraught with danger.  Badly implemented or understood, it can lead to viewing 
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offenders as so unworthy as to be irredeemably evil, thus more demon than human.206  Down that 
road lay many tyrannies, both small and large.  I have explained, however, that appropriate 
safeguards against abuse are feasible, though in practice too oft-ignored.207  But whether I am 
right that a character-based retributive criminal justice system is a desirable one, it is the one we 
have,208 and the risks of its abuses are precisely why, I shall explain below, prosecutors have an 
obligation to take care that their role in this disesteem-imposition system is an appropriate one.209  
 To accept that character-based communicative retribution turns on criminal law’s expressive 
function does not explain, however, why only punishment sends the right message.  Why not 
instead issue a public proclamation that offender and victim are of equal human worth but, in my 
variant, that the former merits less esteem than the latter?  Philosopher Jean Hampton, apparently 
focusing solely on the equal human worth part of this moral equation, and the leading exponent 
of communicative retributive theory, examined this question by discussing a heinous case in 
which a white farmer hung from a tree a black farmhand and his four sons in burlap bags.210  The 
farmer next sliced off the farmhand’s penis and stuck it in his mouth, then burned all five victims 
to death.211  Hampton, relying on the distinction between intended degradation (the desire 
actually to reduce another’s value) and diminishment (the message or appearance of reducing 
value) had this to say about the incident:  
Re-establishment of the acknowledgement of the victim’s worth is normally 
not accomplished by the mere verbal or written assertion of the equality of 
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worth of wrongdoer and victim.  For a judge or jury merely to announce, after 
reviewing the facts of the farmer’s murder of the farmhand and his sons, that 
they were his equal in value is to accomplish virtually nothing. The farmer, by 
his actions, did not just “say” that these men are worthless relative to him, but 
also sought to make them into nothing by fashioning events that purported to 
establish their extreme degradation. Even if we believe that no such 
degradation actually took place, to be strung up, castrated, and killed is to 
suffer a severe diminishment. This representation of degradation requires 
more than just a few idle remarks to deny.212  
 
 Hampton’s example is an extreme one, but it makes the point that actions sometimes do 
indeed “speak” louder than words. Hampton recognizes, and I agree, that there are punitive 
elements in far lesser punishments for lesser crimes.  Probation, compelled drug and 
psychological therapy, even a mandate to obtain a high school equivalency diploma can all, 
under the right circumstances, serve as punishment able to send a message adequate for society 
to hear.213  But that message always includes a component of at least temporary disesteem. 214  
 Critics object that there is no empirical evidence to prove that criminal convictions and 
sentences are the major source of disesteem involved here. To the contrary, it is simply the 
commission of the evil act itself that accounts for nearly the full measure of disesteem, these 
critics argue.215  I offer several brief responses.  First, disesteem-imposition, even if not phrased 
quite this way, is a clear goal of our criminal justice system. The system indeed assumes that 
conviction carries stigma with it and that the degrees of, and actual imposition of, various 
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sentences reflect degrees of disesteem.216  The burden of proving that the system fails in 
accomplishing this goal should lay with the critics.  
 Second, there is indeed significant empirical evidence—much of which I have reviewed in 
other fora217—of the criminal justice system’s effectiveness as a disesteem-generating system.  
For example, there is experimental support for the idea of “delegated revenge”—that victims 
actually prefer a third party’s imposing harsh sanctions on offenders rather than the victims 
themselves doing so.218  This preference, there is reason to believe, arises from victims’ 
perception that the criminal conviction is a public expression of society’s affirmation of the 
victim’s worth as a valued member of the community.219  This explanation is but the flip side of 
the expressive theory of punishment: criminal sanctions affirm the victim’s worth by the 
communal imposition of disesteem on the offender.220   
 Similarly, there is significant empirical data demonstrating that a criminal conviction is an 
obstacle to offenders’ getting jobs after completing their sentences.221  Employers worry that the 
offenders are neither trustworthy nor desirable enough people to welcome into the workplace.222  
For serious offenders, such as sex offenders, public protests against them even residing in certain 
neighborhoods seem to stem not only from fear but from “moral panics” in which the ex-
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offender’s mere presence in the community is viewed as a disease of the body politic.223  Ample 
studies of the extreme severity of American sentences, the harshness of prisons, the resulting 
disruption of family ties and neighborhood bonds, the many “invisible punishments” that plague 
those who long ago paid their debt to society suggest indeed not only that the system is effective 
in disesteem-generation  but that it is too effective, imposing excessive and unduly lasting stigma 
and even crossing the line to demean those caught in its embrace, treating them as inhuman, 
monsters more than men.224  Criminal law theorist George Fletcher put it this way: 
Despite our efforts to overcome discrimination in the areas of race, gender, 
illegitimacy, and alienage (at least by state governments), we still yield to 
the need to stigmatize felons and to treat them as “untouchables.”  They are 
the under-caste of American society. And among the untouchables, the 
worst are clearly the sex offenders, who are treated as inherently suspect for 
the rest of their lives.225  
 
The stigmatizing power of criminal conviction and punishment is so powerful,226 as I hope to 
explain further below, that even its mere potential corrodes an accused’s social status.  Bald 
accusations, arrests, and even trials resulting in acquittals rob each accused of whatever positive 
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social status they have.227  Mere proximity to the system is seen as a fall from grace, despite 
paens to the “presumption of innocence.” 
  3. Race, Disesteem, and Criminal Justice 
   That race still serves as a stigmatic badge is a point supported by a vast literature. In a 
recent Washington Post-ABC News poll, three in ten Americans acknowledged harboring racial 
prejudice.228  This is a staggering percentage given the conventional wisdom that many whites 
will not admit to such prejudice, even to pollsters, because doing so is generally no longer 
socially acceptable.229  Other studies suggest a common strategy employed by individuals is 
simple self-deception about their own racial prejudice.230  Truly unconscious racial prejudice, 
even by whites thoroughly consciously committed to racial equality, is likely even more 
widespread.231   
 Professor Lu-in Wang describes unconscious racial prejudice as “discrimination by 
default.”232  This form of discrimination operates via three broad processes: situational racism, 
self-fulfilling stereotypes, and failures of imagination. “Situational racism” involves the increase 
in racially-biased behavior in “normatively ambiguous” situations, those in which the actor can 
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 See id. at 4. 
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readily and consciously justify his choices based on reasons other than racial bias.233  Self-
fulfilling stereotypes are habits of thought based on preconceptions, habits that can channel our 
thoughts and behavior, filter what evidence we perceive, and color how we interpret that 
evidence—all without our ever being aware that such stereotypes are at work.234  “Failures of 
imagination” describe our limited empathy for those on the short end of the stereotyping stick.235  
Such failures of imagination lead us to see stereotype-consistent explanations for the behavior of 
the oppressed, ignoring or minimizing stereotype-contradicting situational, institutional, or 
character-based explanations.236  These mechanisms work so powerfully that even educating the 
most consciously anti-racist liberal about their existence and operation does little, if anything, to 
limit their effect or to encourage their bearers to recognize them at work.237  These forces are 
likely particularly effective when individuals are asked to make judgments in specific cases—for 
example, whether this individual deserves a job—rather than on broad policy questions, such as 
those concerning the wisdom of affirmative action.238  This combination means that, all else 
being equal, racial minority group members, particularly African-Americans, are likely as a 
group to hold a disproportionate share of society’s stock of disesteem. 
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 Critics of the psychological bias literature argue, however that even racially prejudiced 
attitudes do not necessarily translate into discriminatory action.239  But, here again, ample 
evidence rebuts this argument,240 particularly in the criminal justice system.  For example, the 
available studies show that a disproportionate number of those wrongly convicted have been 
racial minorities.241  This is no random outcome. Thus ample evidence exists of an “other race 
effect” - the increased rate of eyewitness error in making cross-racial identifications, a rate 
particularly high where whites are asked to identify blacks.242  Likewise, ample evidence 
supports both conscious and unconscious racial profiling by the police, that is, the police being 
more likely to watch, investigate, and arrest racial minority group members than whites.243  
Police are also more likely to interpret minority responses to officer questioning as deceptive, 
thus leading to harsher interrogation techniques, again raising the risk of false confessions.244  
There is also some archival evidence that police are more likely to believe what turn out to be 
false informants’ tips when the tipster fingers blacks rather than whites, leading to more 
wrongful arrests. 245  Yet, once arrests are made, police are likely to blind themselves to 
alternative perpetrators, instead collecting evidence confirming their racially-biased 
suspicions.246  Indeed, police repeatedly believing that they have found such confirming evidence 
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leads them to devote ever-more resources to policing minority communities, continually raising 
the percentage of those ensnared in the criminal justice system who are racial minorities.247   
 Other criminal justice system actors—not only the police—seem to be subject to similar 
unconscious racial bias.  Thus white jurors in death penalty cases more readily believe that 
blacks will continue to be dangerous in the future and are more likely to ignore mitigating 
evidence.248  The jurors treat evidence of the defendant’s bad character as more representative of 
the “true character” of his “kind” than are instances of good behavior.249  White jurors also 
engage in what sometimes has been called the “ultimate [fundamental] attribution error.”250  
Remember that the fundamental attribution error is the human tendency to attribute behavior 
more to individual character than to good or bad circumstances.251  Whites make this error with a 
vengeance when evaluating blacks, seeing all bad behavior by blacks as stemming from some 
fundamental flaw in their nature, from an irredeemably unworthy core rather than from an 
unfortunate situation.252  Furthermore, argues at least one commentator, some whites are 
“regressive racists” able to accept egalitarian norms, except when their anger is aroused by racial 
insult.253 Such insult occurs, for example, in a black assault upon a white victim, which 
strengthens racial stereotypes, helping to explain the greater likelihood of the death penalty in 
such black offender/white victim situations.254 
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 Juvenile probation officers are likewise more likely to view black than white families as 
uncooperative, their misbehavior indicative of future dangerousness, their problems due to 
deeply rooted character flaws.255  Juvenile court judges seem to buy into these judgments, for 
young black males are again more likely than their white counterparts to be institutionalized.256  
There is disturbing new evidence of adult criminal court judges suffering similar bias.  Thus an 
archival study found that judges were more likely to mete out heavier sentences to those with 
stereotypically African-American features than those without them.257   
 Indeed, evidence of racial bias in decision making arises at every stage of the criminal 
process—from setting bail, to the effectiveness of defense counsel, to arrest, guilty-plea 
outcomes, and sentencing.258  Often race and class interact to produce these results, but race 
plays a critical role, and disparities in offending rates do not adequately explain these 
differences.259  Although little, if any, empirical work has been done specifically on unconscious 
prosecutorial racial biases (a topic to which I will return to later), it is hard to believe that such 
biases are not afoot.  First, some of the racially-skewed outcomes—such as guilty-plea-
bargaining-outcome differentials—cannot occur without prosecutorial support.260  Second, other 
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outcomes, such as biased sentences, are unlikely to occur absent prosecutor active support, or at 
least prosecutor non-resistance.261  Third, overburdened prosecutors often rely on the police or 
other justice system actors, rather than second-guessing them, thus effectively ratifying others’ 
decisions.262  Fourth, prosecutors are human beings, thus being subject to the same cognitive 
biases as the rest of us.263 
 The reality or appearance of bias is, however, consciously well-understood by minority 
communities.  Perceived unfair procedures, as the vast psychological literature on procedural 
justice effects shows, decrease law-abidingness and willingness to cooperate with the police.264 
These effects thus raise crime rates in minority communities, further strengthening the 
unconscious link between race and crime.265  Moreover, “bystander effects” occur when the 
entirely innocent suffer from the resulting deterioration of neighborhood services and safety, also 
contributing to weakened job opportunities, furthering the impression of racial minorities as 
poor, uneducated, or dangerous because of their own character failures.266 
 The stigmatizing effect of race alone in many facets of American life, and its contributing 
role in other facets, cannot fairly be denied.  In the criminal justice arena, that stigmatization is 
magnified by a perceived race-dangerousness link.267  Experimental data suggests, for example, 
that whites are more likely to notice race first, to process generalized racial features rather than 
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the unique physical features identifying a person as an individual, not merely a group member.268  
Other research shows the increased involvement of the amygdala—which plays a role in 
identifying threat—when whites perceive black faces.269  Two researchers summarized this 
literature this way: 
Thus, the brain has a propensity to detect very early in the time course of 
perception, the presence of threat. Threatening objects (or faces) must then be 
processed differently for an evolutionarily adaptive purpose.  Threatening 
objects are important information in the environment, and the…studies 
demonstrate that out-group members are perceived by the brain as threatening 
and thus that threat alters the information extracted from the situation.270 
 
 Much damage is thus done by the unconscious racial disesteem inflicted by the criminal 
justice system on racial minorities.  All justice system actors have an obligation to work to right 
this wrong.  That obligation should therefore fall as heavily—perhaps more heavily, given their 
duty to do justice—on prosecutors as on anyone else.271  Before prosecutors can act, however, 
they must first have some sense of how they contribute to the problem.  It is that task to which 
this article next turns.   
 B. How Prosecutors Promote the Over-Supply of Racial Disesteem 
  Rather than trying to survey in a single article all prosecutor actions that may contribute 
to racial—stigmatization, here I offer three examples:  (1) the charging decision; (2) guilty plea 
bargaining (which I call the “pricing decision”); and (3) publicity. 
  1. The Charging Decision 
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   The charging decision is a complex one.  Prosecutors must decide, in the first 
instance, whether to charge someone with any crime at all.  Prosecutors may drop some cases as 
not worth pursuing given limited resources.272  Alternatively, they might reach a “pretrial 
probation,” sometimes called a “diversion,” program agreement with an offender.273  Such an 
agreement postpones charging to permit an offender the opportunity to prove he can stay out of 
trouble and to address recidivism risk factors by, for example, getting drug treatment or a high 
school diploma.274  If he successfully completes pretrial probation, the case against him is 
dropped, almost as if it had never been.275  The prosecutors’ power to set conditions for 
successfully completing pretrial probation gives him enormous clout in shaping a suspect’s life, 
at least in the short term. 
 If a prosecutor does decide to proceed with a case, she must decide whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support what particular charges.  Having incomplete information at this stage of the 
prosecution may lead many prosecutors, in an abundance of caution, to charge as many offenses 
as their conscience will bear, a phenomenon dubbed by its critics “overcharging.”276  Prosecutors 
may also use the charging function to lay the groundwork for “wired pleas.”277  These pleas arise 
when prosecutors “charge third parties, such as family members, in order to pressure a defendant 
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to cooperate.”278  In one well-known case, United States v. Pollard,279 for example, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the validity of a plea entered 
into by the defendant primarily because the prosecutor had threatened otherwise to charge the 
defendant’s wife with a crime.  Said the court, “almost anything lawfully within the power of a 
prosecutor acting in good faith can be offered in exchange for a guilty plea.”280 
 Prosecutors may also choose not to pursue a potential prosecution, to drop or reduce pending 
charges, or to recommend lenient sentences for informants who cooperate with the police in 
pursuing other offenders.281  Such cooperators may reveal information, or even testify about, past 
crimes.282  But they also may agree to work undercover, wearing wires, doing drug deals, or 
otherwise participating in new criminal activity in an effort to ensnare other lawbreakers.283  In 
federal cases, in particular, there are tremendous incentives for suspects to cooperate, for by 
doing so they gain release from otherwise applicable statutory mandatory minimum sentences 
and gain a “5K1.1 letter” from the prosecutor recommending a downward departure from the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.284  Even though the Guidelines are technically now “advisory,” 
in practice, they still control in most cases.285  Prosecutors may also have some discretion 
whether to charge crimes seeking mandatory minimums in the first place. 286 Likewise, as in the 
Jena 6 case, prosecutors may often have some discretion whether to proceed against a youthful 
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offender in juvenile or adult court.287  The prosecutor’s charging decision thus may affect the 
entire course of the case—whether it is resolved by plea or a trial, by a harsh or lenient 
punishment, with increased risk of physical harm to the offender (no one likes a “snitch”!) or not. 
But the charging decision independently has implications for the nature and degree of disesteem 
visited upon an offender.288 
 The United States Supreme Court recognized this last point in Rothgery v. Gillespie, County, 
Texas.289  Rothgery was arrested for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He was promptly 
brought before a magistrate judge who apprised Rothgery of the charges against him, found 
probable cause to proceed based upon an affidavit submitted by an arresting officer, and set a 
low bail that Rothgery paid. The police based their arrest decision, however, on an erroneous 
record. Rothgery had indeed been arrested for a previous felony. But the felony charges against 
him had been dismissed after he successfully completed a diversionary (pretrial probation) 
program. Because Rothgery was, therefore, not a convicted felon, he committed no crime by 
possessing a firearm. The current charges against him should, therefore, have readily been 
dismissed. They were not because of a complex series of events that boiled down to a long delay 
in counsel being appointed to represent him—a delay that resulted in his indictment, re-arrest, 
and jailing on heightened bail that he could not pay. The issue before the Court was whether his 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at his initial appearance before a magistrate judge, 
even though no indictment or information had yet been filed and no prosecutor was yet involved 
in the case. The Court held that it did. In reaching its conclusion, the Court emphasized the 
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stigmatic impact of charges being laid, regardless of whether “the machinery of prosecution was 
turned on by the local police or the state attorney general.”290 Explained the Court: 
In this case, for example, Rothgery alleges that after the initial appearance, 
he was “unable to find any employment for wages” because “all of the 
potential employers he contacted knew or learned of the criminal charges 
pending against him.”  [citation omitted].  One may assume that those 
potential employers would still have declined to make job offers if advised 
that the county prosecutor had not filed the complaint.291   
 
 Corporations in the post-Arthur Anderson world likewise recognize the stigmatizing power 
of criminal charges.292 The mere filing of such charges can send stock prices plummeting, 
destroying a business before it has any chance to defend itself.293 To avoid such a calamity, 
corporations readily accept even the most onerous of “deferred prosecution agreements”—a form 
of corporate pretrial probation. 294 Individual white-collar offenders and other middle-class 
suspects also fear the humiliation in their local communities caused by the filing of criminal 
charges.295 Even if individuals in some poor neighborhoods do not fear ostracism in the local 
communities in which they participate, they too will face such ostracism in the broader world.296 
Indeed, as research in the area of pretrial publicity reveals, formal charges are not even 
needed.297 Ostracism flows from the mere fact of arrest—or even of potential arrest.298 Although 
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charges may later be dropped or the offender acquitted, the stigma of association with the 
criminal process lingers.299 
 Does this stigma often extend beyond individuals to their racial groups? There is little, if any, 
hard data, but there is good reason to think so.300 Notably, the same prosecutor cognitive biases 
and institutional forces discussed earlier will still be at work. Those forces suggest a greater 
likelihood of whites getting greater access to diversionary programs, lighter charges, fewer 
referrals of juveniles to adult courts, fewer mandatory minimums, and “sweeter” cooperation 
agreements than will be true of blacks.301 These likely disparities may be the natural 
consequences of biases earlier in the system so that a vastly disproportionate percentage of all 
offenders will be racial minorities in the first place.302 But the other effects mentioned, from an 
enhanced sense of black threat, to police and prosecutors’ tunnel vision suggest that even 
otherwise identically situated whites and blacks face different probabilities of severe stigma from 
the charging process.303 Partly this is so because prosecutors have enormous discretion in 
charging decisions. Absent proof of consciously intentional race or similar discrimination, the 
prosecutor can largely do as she pleases.304 However, such a wide berth for discretion allows for 
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the free play of unconscious biases for which there is currently little legal redress and which 
consciously well-meaning prosecutors will sincerely deny anyway.305 
 There is also ample anecdotal support for these conclusions, some of it particularly well 
summarized by professor and former DC Public Defender Service Chief, Angela Davis. Davis 
writes, for example, about a grand jury’s decision not to indict her colleagues’ white client, 
twenty-five-year-old Georgetown University student David McKnight, on a murder charge.306 
The much taller, heavier McKnight had hacked his fifty-five-year-old, five-foot tall, Vietnamese 
immigrant roommate, John Nguyen, with a machete, almost slicing him in half. The white 
prosecutor promptly invited defense counsel to identify witnesses to testify before the grand jury 
on their client’s behalf.  Indeed, the prosecutor told McKnight’s counsel that a good case could 
be made that McKnight had acted in self-defense. Moreover, suggested the prosecutor, there 
should be witnesses willing to testify that Nguyen had a violent reputation, while McKnight had 
a peaceful one. The two experienced defense attorneys promptly provided the names of such 
witnesses willing to testify. They did just that, and the grand jury voted not to indict. 
 Davis contrasts the McKnight case with that of Daniel Ware, a thirty-five-year-old African-
American high school graduate living in an impoverished neighborhood and periodically 
working at manual labor.307 Ware got in an argument with a local gangster, Darryl Brown, well-
known as a gun-toting, violent character, who had done time for armed robbery and weapons 
offenses. The argument arose because Brown allegedly threatened Ware’s younger brother. The 
argument ended with Brown’s threatening retaliation against Ware, so Ware began carrying a 
knife.  One day Brown reached inside his jacket and threatened Ware, who promptly stabbed 
Brown once in the chest, killing him. Davis, as Ware’s defender, found eyewitnesses confirming 
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her client’s version of the events, as well as witnesses familiar with Brown’s violent reputation.  
But, unlike in David McKnight’s case, Ware’s prosecutor never offered to present exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury, which indicted Ware for first-degree murder.  Yet Ware had at least 
as strong a self-defense claim as did McKnight. Davis recognized that many factors may have 
contributed to the disparity between the two cases and that neither prosecutor harbored racial ill 
will.  Nevertheless, Davis concluded,  
 Although race and class appear to have played a part in the decision in 
McKnight’s case, there was no evidence that the prosecutor took either race or 
class into account in making his decision.  In fact, it is very unlikely that he 
consciously decided to give favorable treatment to McKnight because he was 
white.  However, the prosecutor, who was white, may very well have 
unconsciously empathized with McKnight as a young college student with a 
future, while simultaneously feeling no such empathy for Nguyen, a poor 
Vietnamese immigrant whose future extended no further than the kitchen of 
the restaurant where he worked. The fact that Nguyen had no family or 
anyone else demanding that McKnight be punished made the decision even 
easier.308 
 
Davis’s reading of the case is consistent with the sort of failures of racial empathy described in 
the cognitive scientific literature.309  
 Another tale makes the impact of the charging decision on racial stigma even sharper.  
Marcus Dixon, a football player at Pepperel High School in Rome, Georgia, was an honor 
student with a 3.96 GPA, over 1,200 on his SATs, and awarded a full scholarship to attend 
Vanderbilt University.310  Marcus, eighteen-years-old at the time, was charged with rape, sexual 
battery, aggravated assault, false imprisonment, statutory rape, and aggravated child molestation 
in a single incident involving a fifteen-year-old white girl.  He claimed, however, that the sex 
was consensual, and a jury quickly agreed, acquitting him of most of the charges within twenty 
minutes. However, the jurors convicted him of the two charges for which consent was irrelevant: 
                                               
308
 Id. at 21-22. 
309
 See WANG, supra note 231, at 51 -60.  
310
 See DAVIS, supra note 261, at 32-33. 
 55 
statutory rape (sexual intercourse with a minor) and aggravated child molestation (sex with a 
minor that causes injury, the injury being the deflowering of a virgin). However, Georgia’s 
penalty for the latter charge was a mandatory ten years imprisonment, a sentence that a 
prosecutor sought and the trial judge imposed. At least one of the jurors was stunned, declaring 
that she never would have convicted Dixon of the charge had she known of the consequences.  
One of the legislators who had spearheaded the legislation creating the defense publicly declared 
that it was intended “to protect children from predators. Marcus Dixon was not a predator.”311  
The African-American community clearly perceived the conviction and sentence as a group 
insult, members of that community holding “rallies and otherwise advocat[ing] for Marcus’s 
release, alleging that the prosecution was racially motivated.”312 The Supreme Court of Georgia 
ultimately reversed the conviction for aggravated child molestation, finding “a clear legislative 
intent to prosecute the conduct that the jury determined to have occurred in this case as 
misdemeanor statutory rape.”313 The case prosecutor, John McClellan, admitted that he added the 
aggravated child molestation charge as a “backstop” in case Dixon were acquitted of rape.314 
Apparently, not once did the prosecutor, who apparently was really concerned about forcible, 
non-consensual rape, ask himself whether, if the jury disagreed, the mandatory ten-year sentence 
for the mere “backstop” charge was appropriate.315 Not once did he consider whether the charge 
was truly consistent with legislative intent.  Not once did he weigh the resulting likely 
heightened public perception of group-based stigma arising from a conviction playing into hoary 
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stereotypes about oversexed black men who prey on white women, nor did he pause to reflect 
upon whether his own unconscious biases may have entered into the (over)charging decision.316  
  2. Guilty Pleas: The Pricing Decision 
   a. Criminal Justice Markets 
    There is a branch of behavioral economics known as “fair pricing theory.”317 This 
discipline addresses the emotional reaction of buyers to prices that they perceive to be unfair.318 
Its relevance here is that the United States Supreme Court and numerous commentators have 
come to think of the plea bargaining process in contract terms: an exchange of benefits and 
burdens in a market economy.319 The plea itself and any conditions imposed on it (for example, 
the offender’s agreeing to testify at trial against a more serious offender) can be thought of as the 
“price” the state charges the accused in exchange for a recommendation of more lenient 
treatment.320   
 I do not plan to address fair pricing theory here in any detail, though I have done so in a 
forthcoming work.321 Instead, I want briefly to summarize those of its teachings that are relevant 
to the guilty plea process as a framework for understanding how that process affects the 
disesteem economy. 
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 The major relevant fair price theory teachings are these. First, prices that violate social norms 
of equity, equality, and need will be perceived as distributively unfair.322 “Equity” means getting 
what you pay for; “equality” means being treated the same as others similarly situated; and 
“need” means making special allowance for the disadvantaged.323 Second, pricing processes that 
deny the buyer voice and choice, transparency, and impartiality will be perceived as procedurally 
unfair.324 “Voice” means having some real say in the pricing decision—a sense of control and of 
not being subjected to unfair advantage-taking.325 A buyer having a real choice among a range of 
viable alternatives and the freedom to exit one potential deal for a better one gives the buyer 
some measure of voice.326 Transparency means that the negotiating process and outcome seem 
rational and understandable.327 “Impartiality” means that favoritism does not affect the 
negotiating process.328 Third, violations of these fairness principles trigger reciprocity norms—
norms of retaliation sparked by anger at unfair treatment.329 The degree of anger and severity of 
the retaliatory response will depend on the permanence of the violations, the buyer’s perceived 
ability to control them and to pin the violations on a particular individual seller, and the nature of 
the seller’s motives.330 But the primary cause of retributive anger, we have already seen, is the 
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perception of being treated as less worthy than you are, partly meaning being disesteemed. 331 
Unfair seller treatment of a buyer in bargaining thus both reflects the buyer’s lower status and 
marks him with it. So understood, a contract involves not only an exchange of goods and 
services but also of esteem and disesteem. 
 If the guilty plea process seems to give offenders less of a benefit than they pay for obtaining 
it, treats racial minority offenders worse than white ones, and ignores disadvantages that account 
for the offender’s plight and limited bargaining power, then offenders will see themselves as 
being denied distributive fairness.  If, correspondingly, offenders perceive limited options and 
minimal voice in plea outcomes, view the process as neither rational nor understandable, and 
believe that they have not been treated impartially, they will view themselves as denied 
retributive justice.  Furthermore, if they see the wrongs done them as relatively permanent, their 
own control over and responsibility for the wrongs minimal, and the prosecutor’s motives ill 
ones, offenders will react with retributive anger. Such anger will impede rehabilitation and 
encourage re-offending.332 Equally importantly, the offenders’ perceptions likely reflect, at least 
at the unconscious level, those of the prosecutor and the broader society, making treatment of the 
offender during the bargaining process a mark of disesteem.333 If the existence of this 
opprobrium is linked to race, whether via racial disparities, unconscious racial biases, or harsher 
prosecutor treatment of racial minorities on all measures of unfairness because of the offender’s 
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race (for many of these bargaining ills may affect whites as well, but to a lesser degree and not 
because of their race), then it is racial disesteem that the plea bargaining process will reflect and 
promote.334 
 Is this imagined state of affairs an accurate description of the real-world plea-bargaining 
process? My short answer, which I will now explain, is “yes.” 
  b. Fair-Pricing of Guilty Pleas? 
 The most obvious breach of fair pricing principles in the plea negotiation process arises from 
the often vast disparity in bargaining power between the muscular state and the typically weak 
defendant.335 This point has been made repeatedly in the literature, so I offer but a brief summary 
here.  Notably, the defense has limited access to information, especially early in a case. For 
example, there is no general constitutional right to discovery.336 It is true that Brady v. 
Maryland337 and Giglo v. United States338 require prosecutors to produce respectively direct and 
impeaching exculpatory evidence at trial. A broad reading of the more recent United States v. 
Ruiz339 case, however, suggests that no such evidence need be produced before a guilty plea.340 
Statutory and related discovery rules in even the more generous jurisdictions are also timid next 
to civil discovery rules. For example, depositions are rare, and defense counsel cannot compel 
prosecution witnesses to give even informal pretrial interviews.341 Nor, in many jurisdictions, 
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can defense counsel simply get the name of prosecution witnesses.342 Even jurisdictions with 
“open file” policies in practice provide the defense with little information relative to the civil 
system.343 “Altogether, the discovery rules pose massive barriers to determining the facts, 
assessing witness credibility, and developing prior to trial a well-informed estimate of the 
probability of conviction.”344 The result, concludes NYU law professor Stephen Schulhofer, is 
that “plea bargains are often struck on the basis of incomplete, highly imperfect information and 
little more than the attorney’s guess about what a trial might reveal if one were held.”345 
 Heavy caseloads result in assembly-line justice in which relatively little time is devoted to 
the run-of-the-mill case.346 Contrary to the position of the Untied States Supreme Court, the 
presence of defense counsel in such cases does not erase the disparity between the many poor, 
meagerly-educated inner-city defendants and the far wealthier state.347 Defense counsel are 
overworked and underpaid, and private defense counsel radically underpaid.348 This under-
resourcing creates incentives to settle cases in brief negotiations and with equally brief 
consultation with clients.349 The bazaar-like atmosphere of a system in which most cases end in 
pleas promotes a case-processing, “teamwork” approach, rather than true adversarialness, at least 
for the vast numbers of cases that never get to trial.350 Lawyers under time pressure and with 
inadequate information engage in stereotyping, cases starting to fit into categories, each of which 
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has a “going rate,” rather than each client’s being envisioned as unique.351  Clients can often be 
too young, drug-addicted, or mentally-impaired to understand the consequences of their choices 
and rarely get adequate time to consider them.352 
 It is true that prosecutors are also often fatigued and time-pressed.353 But they have the 
police’s investigation efforts, often have ready access to a significant number of their own 
investigating detectives and of police forensics units, and in large cities have huge reservoirs of 
additional resources that they can draw on where needed.354  Furthermore, the law empowers 
them.  In the federal system, as mentioned earlier, only prosecutors effectively have the power to 
free defendants from the spectre of mandatory minimum sentences, and cooperation with the 
prosecutor is the surest route for getting a sentence below the usual guidelines range.355 The risk 
of suffering grave punishment upon going to trial gives most defendants little convincing ability 
to insist upon a trial if they dislike a prosecutor’s offer.356 
 Many prosecutors are eager to press their advantage. Stunningly, the law often permits 
prosecutors to refuse even to attempt bargaining unless defendants first waive their rights to 
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discovery of certain evidence, to challenge the admissibility of some evidence, to claim 
prosecutorial misconduct, to waive rights to receive later-discovered  evidence of innocence, to 
waive rights to appeal, and even to object on grounds of ineffective assistance  of counsel.357  
Defendants face grave trial risks if they refuse waiver, for making that choice leaves trial as the 
only option.358  Yet if defendants do waive these rights and no deal is reached, they have an even 
greater chance of conviction at trial.  They have assisted in their own destruction. 
 This power disparity contributes to client distrust of both his counsel and the state.359  
Negotiations are more likely to feel like coerced self-immolation than an opportunity for an 
effective voice in the plea-bargaining “pricing” decision.360 Limited options, all harsh, mean no 
real choice, no chance to exit as a means of conveying dissent. 361 When prosecutors press their 
power to the fullest, defendants (and even defense counsel) fear their weakness has led to 
advantage-taking.362 The sense of equity—of getting equal value for what you paid—is 
missing.363 Poverty, danger, and poor neighborhood educational opportunities may lead some 
defendants to see themselves as in need, perhaps society partly being at fault for these 
defendants’ plight, yet the state offers them no “discount” for their suffering.364 
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 Nor will the plea-bargaining process seem “transparent” (rational and understandable) to 
them.365 Sentencing guidelines, for example, are notoriously complex, especially at the federal 
level, as are many aspects of criminal procedure.366 In routine cases, defense lawyers negotiate 
outside their client’s involvement or even presence.367 Consultation time about a plea with 
counsel can be so hurried as to leave the client with little real understanding of how or why a 
sentence was agreed upon.368 At best, the client understands only that he will receive that 
sentence. 369 The rote, mantra-like guilty plea colloquy reinforces the mystery of the process 
rather than diminishing it.370 
 Moreover, defendants see their lawyers negotiate with a particular person—a specific 
prosecutor.  Whatever willingness offenders might have to take responsibility for their actions is 
likely to be dampened by perceived abuses by their very human adversary, who is backed up by 
(and linked to) the power of the state, including the police—police whom the client might 
already hold in contempt.371 The price imposed on the client is not temporary either. It may last 
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five, ten, twenty years, even a lifetime.372 The client will likely attribute ill motives to the state 
and be angry. 
 Perceived disparate racial treatment from profiling, racially biased sentences, racially biased 
verdicts, and other sources (detailed above) likewise violates equality norms.373 Merely being in 
courtrooms and prisons where a black offender sees a sea of nearly all black faces must raise 
suspicions that something is amiss. Offenders or suspects’ retributive anger will be one factor 
raising the risk of their re-offending.374 But their local communities are fully aware of the biases 
and abuses suffered by individuals.375 The communities desperately want safety but not at the 
price of biased, otherwise flawed procedures; the frequent hassling of the innocent; the undue 
harshness of penalties; and the ill community impacts of neighborhoods denuded of many young 
men, filled with others whose criminal records leave them with little hope for useful 
employment.376 Neighborhoods detoriate further, as does respect for and cooperation with the 
law, and crime rises as procedural justice theories suggest.377  
 All this in turn reinforces a popular linkage between skin color and crime. Disesteem reigns, 
not just for the individual offenders but for others of his race and class.378 Political scientist 
Murray Edelman explains: “It is common and easy to define various kinds of disadvantaged 
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groups as inferior, dangerous, unworthy, or even non-human.”379 Such labels, argues Edelman, 
seem necessary to justify continuing their unequal treatment and to intensifying their 
disadvantage.380 Crime plays a special role in this labeling process, says Edelman, a “cover” for 
the often subconscious playing out of racial and class prejudice in the actions of police, 
prosecutors, judges, and juries.381 “Consciously, and probably more often subconsciously, 
criminals are merged with others who are feared or resented: color minorities, religious 
minorities, ideological minorities, ethnic minorities, and especially the poor.”382 For some 
people, criminal justice institutions represent justice and safety, but for the oppressed minorities, 
these institutions are but symbols of unequal status and power.383 The result of this labeling 
process and division of world views is to divide society into those presumed respectable and 
those presumed the contrary.384 Indeed, minority groups may compete among themselves over 
who gets to be in the highest rungs of the lowest part of the ladder of social esteem, while 
majorities avoid, to the extent they can, minorities like the plague.385 Even middle-class whites 
working with blacks of the same class usually live in different neighborhoods and rarely 
socialize or form close friendships outside the workplace.386 This polarization of the population 
makes common cause with, and on behalf of, racial minorities hard.  That absence of joint 
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political action further promotes differing worldviews and group polarization—“us/them” 
thinking.387  
 Yet most racial minority group members do not engage in crime.388 They struggle to make 
their lives work but often see what seem to them to be unfair obstacles before them while the 
wicked prosper. Speaking on their behalf, Edelman concludes: 
 Opinions about social status and about claims that particular groups are 
especially worthy of esteem or of suspicion or contempt tend to persist and be 
exaggerated even if there is clear evidence that the claims should be 
discounted. Working-class people or the poor typically have abilities and 
virtues that win them little or no esteem, for example. They may be far more 
generous to other disadvantaged people than elites are, may be taxed more 
onerously, or may do work that is of greater benefit.  Elites may [sometimes] 
be corrupt, self-seeking, or inept at what they claim to do, but they 
nevertheless experience little or no blame as a result. 389 
 
 The reaction of elites and subordinate groups alike to the criminal justice system’s role in 
perpetuating racially skewed distributions of esteem and disesteem can be complex.  A study of 
order-maintenance-policing in New York City—a police approach requiring enforcement, 
including arrest, of even the most minor of offenses—makes the point.390 The data show that 
within every jurisdiction type—urban, suburban, rural, poor—white defendants do better than 
minority defendants.391 Explains law professor Josh Bower, “minorities were convicted and sent 
to jail more frequently, they received longer jail sentences than whites, and they were offered 
fewer ACDs [pretrial probations]”.392 But across jurisdictions a different pattern emerged.  For 
“quality of life offenses,” annoying, minor crimes, parents are likely to be particularly incensed 
                                               
387
 See EDELMAN, supra note 380, at 117; TILLY, supra note 385, at 53-60; CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 
supra note 99, at 69-76 (2008) (explaining group polarization); DAVID BERREBY, US AND THEM: UNDERSTANDING 
YOUR TRIBAL MIND (2005). 
388
 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2008 202,212 (2008); See William J. 
Stuntz, Race, Class and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1802 (1998).  
389
 EDELMAN, supra note 380, at 55. 
390
 For a scathing attack on order-maintenance policing, see generally BERNARD HARCOURT, ILLISION OF ORDER: 
THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2005). 
391
 See Bowers, supra note 27, at 118.  
392
 Id. at 118. 
 67 
at their children suffering serious punishments.393 In poor, urban, minority areas, residents 
usually do “not…wield terrific electoral clout.”394 Nevertheless, they have the power of 
resistance—of non-cooperation with the police, anger, looking away from offenses they do 
observe, a power that procedural justice research suggests they will use.395 On the other hand, 
they are less likely to resist so openly and vigorously when serious, violent offenders are 
punished because, whatever costs this may impose on the community, it leads to some apparent 
gains as well in neighborhood safety.396 Police cannot ignore growing community pushback. 
They need some base level of community trust, however small.397 The data show how the system 
accommodated this tension: police still arrested minor offenders with previously relatively clean 
criminal records at high rates but prosecutors decreased sentences dramatically upon conviction 
in poor urban areas.398 Such sentencing decreases did not occur in majority white 
neighborhoods.399 The odd result was that most whites living in white areas suffered harsher 
sentences than blacks living in black areas, albeit for minor crimes only, regardless of other 
circumstances.400 Bowers calls this “grassroots plea-bargaining”—community resistance alters 
going rates in individual cases.401 
 Absent such pushback, of course, punishment of racial minorities is likely to stay 
significantly harsher for minorities than whites. In Bowers’ words, “[I]t seems that when 
prosecutors offer lenient prices of their own volition, they typically exercise that kind of 
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discretion to the benefit of white defendants.”402 Moreover, disparate treatment of racial 
minorities in minority neighborhoods relative to whites seems to continue apace.403 Furthermore, 
given these minority-biased disparities, the lack of publicity for minority neighborhoods getting 
a break for minor cases, the minor nature of those cases, and the continued impact of the various 
cognitive biases and institutional forces discussed throughout this article, it is unlikely that this 
modest “grassroots plea bargaining” will do much to moderate the ill effects of most 
prosecutorial bargaining practices on racial disesteem. 404 However, the grassroots model may 
contribute to early thinking about esteem-informed systemic reform that I hope to spark in a brief 
discussion of the subject in this article’s conclusion.   
  3. Publicity Strategies 
   Prosecutors’ use of publicity as a way to promote disesteem is important yet can be 
addressed briefly because the central points are not in dispute. Most criminal cases escape media 
coverage.405 Pre-trial publicity is, therefore, usually local, limited to the friends, family, and 
neighborhood of the accused and the victims, largely being passed along by word-of-mouth. In 
the subset of cases that do receive media coverage, however, the coverage is usually heavily 
biased against the defendant.406 This occurs for a variety of reasons, not the least important of 
which is that police and prosecutors have far more access to information early in a case than does 
the defense, so primarily the law enforcement version of events is what makes the evening 
news.407 Moreover, the press is dependent upon law enforcement for rapid access to information 
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needed to make deadlines, especially early in the case.408 Accordingly, the press pays a high cost 
in reduced access if it slants coverage in ways disliked by law enforcement, including 
prosecutors. Although a variety of complex factors affect the extent to which the public attends 
to and is affected by media crime coverage, strong evidence suggests that there are often 
significant effects detrimental to the accused.409  In high-profile cases with long time spans, the 
defense may over time be able to offer a counter-story, but early media coverage has done much 
damage to an accused’s reputation along the way—damage that may not be entirely undone even 
by an acquittal.410 Where researchers disagree is over the impact of press coverage on trial 
outcomes.  Pessimists believe that mechanisms that include aggressive voir dire, sequestration, 
cautionary jury instructions, and perhaps even venue change will do little to improve trial 
fairness, while optimists believe the opposite.411 But even a fair trial followed by an acquittal 
does not necessarily erase the damage done to the accused’s esteem.412 
 A conviction, of course, magnifies disesteem, but, where the trial was a fair one, that is how 
it should be.413 But press coverage of pending sentencing proceedings may arguably heighten 
disesteem beyond what the facts warrant. In any case, disesteem imposed upon the individual for 
his wrongful actions never justifies imposing resulting disesteem upon his racial group.414 Yet 
ample empirical evidence suggests that, at least in racially-charged cases, that may be just what 
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happens.415 Moreover, even subconsciously racially-tinged cumulative media coverage—such as 
showing more blacks in “perp” walks; broadcasting black faces in connection with violent 
crimes, white faces for non-violent ones; covering the causes of “ghetto” and racial gang 
violence—can help to associate racial group membership with the worst of crimes.416 
 Ethics rules do govern the proper scope of prosecutors’ statements to the media in individual 
cases.417 But the rules may too often be honored in the breach and do not address cumulative 
racial-group biases, conscious or otherwise, fostered by prosecutor comments.418 Few 
prosecutors would consciously seek to fan racial bias, though there are a small number of glaring 
exceptions.419 But neither the ethics rules nor hurried legal practice require, or even encourage, 
prosecutors simply to give thought to the broader racial impact of their words to the press—
though many careful prosecutors likely try to do so.420 Furthermore, prosecutors simply cannot 
control the media statements of many other criminal justice system actors, from victims, to 
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 See ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN 
AMERICA 78-93 (2000). Entman and Rojecki conclude: 
 
 The racial stereotyping of Blacks encouraged by the images and implicit comparisons to 
Whites on local news reduces the latter’s empathy and heightens animosity, as demonstrated 
empirically by several experimental studies. To the extent local television news thereby 
undermines the fragile foundations of racial comity, it could reduce apparent and real 
responsiveness of White-dominated society to the needs of poor minorities, especially Blacks. 
The result, in turn, is continued employment discrimination and government unresponsiveness 
to the urban job loss and economic dislocation that has so traumatized the inner city—and 
consequent breeding of crime. 
 
Id. at 91. 
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 See id. at 81-86; See generally Negative News and Little Else, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1990, at 1; Tarso Luis 
Ramos, L.A. Story:Who gains from framing gang attacks as ethnic cleansing?, COLORLINES, July 1, 2007. 
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 See MODEL RULES PROF. CONDUCT 3.6, 3.8. 
418
 See id. (containing no references to race-bias); Taslitz, Free Press Paradigm, supra note 40, at 21-27 (offering 
Duke rape case as an infamous example of the rules being honored in the breach).  But see Comment, MODEL RULES 
PROF. CONDUCT 8.4 (declaring that certain expressions of racial bias by lawyers, if prejudicial to the administration 
of justice, may violate a rule that itself never mentions race—a relatively toothless aspirational comment that, while 
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than the far more subtle issues of racial esteem discussed here). 
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 See Taslitz, Free Press Paradigm, supra note 40, at 1-4, 21-27 (discussing one such egregious exception). 
420
 Cf. SUTHERS, supra note 273, at 102-08 (describing one conscientious prosecutor’s struggles to deal with the 
media in a way that is fair to them, the broader public, and the defense). 
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interest-group commentators, to potential jurors. First amendment rights also limit what can be 
done to limit either these voices or the prosecutor’s.421 Nevertheless, the risks of racial harm 
seem sufficiently high as to counsel extreme prosecutor caution in dealing with the press, not 
only in individual cases but in the overall tenor of the comments flowing from various assistants 
in a prosecutors’ office. Even if other societal forces may explain much of the media’s racial bias 
in criminal cases, prosecutors should not contribute to worsening the problem. 
  4. Summing Up 
   Because one function of the criminal justice system is to impose disesteem on 
individuals, there will always be a demand for disesteem-generation by the state. Moreover, 
because the criminal justice system purports to generate a particular type of disesteem—one 
marking serious moral harms done to the public—it is the broader public that will generate this 
demand. Furthermore, because of endemic institutional and unconscious society-wide forces, 
much of this demand—again, usually “virtual,” subconscious demand—will be to visit disesteem 
not merely upon the individual but upon his racial group should that group be one in the minority 
and having a recent or long-standing history of being racially-stigmatized. Finally, because most 
prosecutors are elected, and even the appointed ones rise at least partly through local politics, the 
demand for criminal justice system-generated racial disesteem will also be at least partly local, 
thus varying in nature and degree from one geographic area to another.422 
 This demand for racial disesteem will be for disesteem services.  Prosecutors are important 
providers of those services.  As we have seen, their decisions on whether and what to charge, 
how to negotiate plea deals and for what end, what to say to the press, and what sentences to 
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 See Taslitz, Free Press Paradigm, supra note 40, at 28-42 (discussing these constitutional limitations). 
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 See SUTHERS, supra note 273, at 109 (noting service both as a locally-elected prosecutor and a federally-
appointed one), 116 (“When you accept the president’s nomination to be U.S. attorney, you know your tenure is tied 
to his and that your wonderful job will come to a relatively quick conclusion); see generally Sheila Vera Flynn, A 
Complex Portrayal of Social Norms and the Expressive Function of Law, 36 UWLA L. Rev. 145 (2005).   
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seek can have profound consequences in contributing to racial disesteem. The extreme example 
of the Jena 6 may reflect a broader culture of racial disesteem in Jena as a community.  The mere 
existence of the “white tree,” the use of images of lynching in response to black student dissent, 
the inter-racial violence spawned in the wake of these events all support this (informed) 
speculation. If it is correct, then prosecutor Reed Walters could not have been elected if his 
actions were not expected to promote some locally desired level of criminal justice system 
disesteem-generation. I am not suggesting conscious or overt racial bias by either Walters or the 
white Jena community. That may or may not be so. But, as the review of the economy of racial 
disesteem above explains, a strong system of disesteem market exchange can occur via entirely 
unconscious processes. 
 Prosecutors are, however, more than mere generators of racial disesteem in geographically 
and topically local economies of disesteem. They also serve as indirect regulators of broader 
economies of racial disesteem. Partly because of the special expressive power of the criminal 
justice system, racial group members start the daily struggle for esteem at a disadvantage. They 
may be marked with some measure of disesteem simply because of their racial group 
membership and find it harder to gain esteem by their actions for the same reason. By altering 
the initial distribution of esteem and disesteem themselves and of esteem and disesteem services, 
and by making market exchanges of all these things “stickier” for racial group members, that is, 
by slowing exchange and making it more costly, racial group members find competing for 
individual esteem particularly hard.423 Even if one accepts the ethic of equal opportunity, this 
hardly seems a model consistent with that ethic. In light of these observations, what, if anything, 
should a well-meaning prosecutor do? Space constraints limit the answer I can give here, but I 
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 Cf. CHIP HEATH & DAN HEATH, MADE TO STICK: WHY SOME IDEAS SURVIVE AND OTHERS DIE (2007). 
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offer some brief observations concerning both parts of this question: (1) Are prosecutors 
obligated to do anything at all?; (2) If yes, what, at a minimum, should that be? 
IV. PROSECUTORS’ OBLIGATIONS 
 A. Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism 
 The current ethical model for prosecutors is what I will call Do-Justice Adversarialism.  
Adversarialism is a familiar model.  Lawyers for each side serve as advocates for their respective 
client’s positions. Each lawyer’s goal is to maximize the gain for his side.424 “Gain” is often, 
though not always, measured in significant part by things that can be quantified: money, years in 
prison, length of time subject to an injunction.425 Within broad ethical limits prohibiting, for 
example, outright lies, conflicts of interest, criminal activities, or overt appeals purely to high-
wrought emotions or to racial or similar biases, each side in the adversarial war should do all that 
he or she can to win.426 Moreover, combat focuses primarily on the individual case and the 
individual client, rather than on the overall gain for some “cause” or another on each side or on 
net social gain, though there are variants on this model (class actions, “cause lawyering”) not 
relevant here that may vary somewhat this portion of the central model.427 The combat of 
adversaries over individual disputes is, however, thought to maximize societal welfare in the 
aggregate and in the long run.428 Adversarialism is thus consistent with free market principles of 
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 See TASLITZ, RAPE AND CULTURE, supra note 60, at 103-04 (describing the nature of the adversary system); 
Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarialism, Criminal Justice, and the Rehnquist Court: The Sluggish Life of 
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an “invisible hand” moving self-interested parties toward serving an overall social good that they 
never intended.429 
 Prosecutors, especially at trial, are indeed expected to embrace the adversarial model.430 But 
they have another obligation—to “do justice”—that may in theory often require tempering 
adversarial zeal.431 The meaning of the obligation to “do justice” is ambiguous and disputed.432 
More specific rules give it meat in only the narrowest slice of professional situations.433 At a 
minimum, however, there is broad support for the principle that doing justice means ensuring fair 
procedures.434 Yet even this minimalist conception is often narrowly understood. Notably, the 
obligation focuses on conscious and overt actions that may undermine fair procedures.435 For 
example, consciously seeking to exclude blacks from juries because “those people” do not 
believe the police, consciously pitching closing arguments solely to juror anger, or knowingly 
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 See DAVIS, supra note 261, at 12 (“The criminal justice system is adversarial by design.  Ideally, a capable and 
zealous defense attorney represents the accused, and a similarly capable prosecutor represents the state.”). 
431
 See id. at 13. 
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 See Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice”?, 26 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 607, 613-18 (1999) 
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 See Green, supra note 433, at 634-35.  Green describes the scope of the prosecutor’s duty to do justice thus: 
 
Doing justice comprises various objectives which are, for the most part, implicit in our 
constitutional and statutory schemes. They derive from our understanding of what it means 
for the sovereign to govern fairly.  Most obviously, these include enforcing the criminal law 
by convicting and punishing some (but not all) of those who commit crimes; avoiding 
punishment of those who are innocent of criminal wrongdoing (a goal which, as reflected in 
the “presumption of innocence,” is of paramount importance); and affording the accused, and 
others, a lawful, fair process.  Additionally, most would agree, the sovereign has at least two 
other aims.  One is to treat individuals with proportionality; that is, to ensure that individuals 
are not punished more severely than deserved. The other is to treat lawbreakers with rough 
equality; that is, similarly situated individuals should generally be treated in roughly the same 
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Id. at 634.  Green characterizes this description as nothing novel but rather “a reminder of the traditional 
understanding.” 
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 See id. at 634 (cataloguing “do justice” obligations that all seem to involve primarily conscious prosecutor 
choices, though also seeming to include prosecutorial negligence-avoidance as well). 
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seeking to introduce blatantly inadmissible evidence for the sole purpose of prejudicing the jury 
would violate the duty to do justice, though, as so understood, that obligation may be hard to 
distinguish from the broad limits also imposed on defense counsel.436 Perhaps a clearer example 
of a “do justice” rationale is the ethical and constitutional rule requiring prosecutors to produce 
material exculpatory evidence to the defense.437 The defense does not have a reciprocal 
obligation to share such evidence with the prosecutor pre-trial, though the defense may choose to 
do so.438 The do-justice model also seems to extend to some acts of prosecutorial negligence.439 
Nevertheless, as a general rule, the minimalist conception of Do-Justice Adversarialism focuses 
on what the prosecutor consciously knows or intends or what he should know given what 
information is already available to his conscious deliberation.440 Some prosecutors’ offices may 
by office policy, and some individual prosecutors may by preference, substantially expand upon 
this minimalist vision, but there is no current consensus requiring such expansion.441 
                                               
436
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CASSIDY, supra note 437, at 71. 
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 See generally CASSIDY, supra note 437 (surveying prosecutors’ major ethical obligations without once addressing 
duties arising from the risks of unconscious or institutional biases). 
441
 See HARMFUL ERROR, supra note 437, at 14 (noting that Brooklyn, NY District Attorney Charles Hynes 
instituted an office policy requiring his personal approval of any decision to charge a suspect based on a single 
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 I propose expanding the minimalist ideal in two ways.  First, prosecutors have an affirmative 
obligation to take steps to reduce, with the aim of eliminating, even subconsciously-caused racial 
disesteem from their handling of individual cases. My argument is a simple one: the evidence for 
inadvertent prosecutorial contribution to racial disesteem is sufficiently strong that ignoring it is 
a form of “willful blindness,” a state of semi-conscious indifference so extreme as to be morally 
equivalent to knowingly inflicting unnecessary and unwarranted suffering on another.442 This 
obligation does not mean that prosecutors must be able to “read” their own or others’ 
subconscious minds in individual cases. But it does mean that the prosecutor must use care to 
consider the potential racial subtext of each action the prosecutor takes—from charging, to plea 
bargaining, to opening arguments, to sentencing.443 Doing so requires attention to the raced 
“cultural meaning” of prosecutor actions, thus requiring the prosecutor to be familiar with the 
relevant psychological literature.444 Various law reform entities are indeed working on training 
courses to help prosecutors with just this task.445 Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism thus brings 
a concern with deliberation about raced cultural meanings into the prosecutorial mindset, but this 
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model is still one focused largely on the individual case, albeit with a heightened sensitivity to its 
social implications. 
 But the harms of racial disesteem affect non-defendants too—innocents temporarily ensnared 
by the system, neighborhoods devastated by poverty and despair, tarnished raced reputations of 
individuals neither directly brought into the system nor condemned to life in blighted 
locations.446 To address these broader concerns, my second suggestion is to rely on an entirely 
different ethical model. Modified Do-Justice Adversarialism is concerned directly with the 
prosecutor’s relationship with the accused but only indirectly with its impact on third parties.  
My alternative model—the Medical Model—governs the prosecutor’s direct relationship with 
these third parties, institutions, and communities, and with the “People” as a whole. I recognize 
that a different term might be needed to capture this model’s emphasis on the prosecutor’s 
lawyerly role, but the term, the “Medical Model” for now captures mostly clearly the controlling 
metaphor.   
 B. The Medical Model 
  The Medical Model would be governed by three principles: 
• First, prevention is better than treatment; 
• Second, if treatment is necessary, at least do no harm, and 
• Third, treat the Body of the People holistically, recognizing that the health of the mind 
(including the subconscious mind) and of the Body interact.447 
 The prosecutor’s duty to do “do justice” stems from his representing the People—all the 
People, rather than any individual.448 The argument has even been made that the prosecutor in 
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part represents the interests of the defendant, who, though suffering temporary limitations on his 
political and other freedoms, is still part of the American people; the prosecutor thus shows 
respect for the offender by holding him to account for his wrongs, for he is then treated as an 
autonomous individual capable of making reasoned choices and being responsible for his 
actions.449 In any event, the prosecutor’s social role is in part to impose proportional disesteem 
on individual criminal offenders, not to wreak undue disesteem on the guilty or any on the 
innocent. Moreover, because the prosecutor represents the People, he should do what is 
reasonably within his power as a prosecutor to reduce the harm they suffer, both as victims of 
crime and as a result of the prosecutor’s efforts to “treat” the symptom of disease—crime—
raging within the Body Politic. The prosecutor should not leave the patient worse off than it 
would be without treatment and indeed should try to maximize the return to health. Thus the 
three Medical Model principles of helping to prevent harm, not causing harm, and recognizing 
that there are holistic implications for all the People (the patient) come into play when we treat 
only the symptom (the crime)—and treat it as an isolated symptom—at that. Given this country’s 
sordid racial history and its continuing racial troubles and the criminal justice system’s role in 
these troubles,450 the argument for application of these Medical Model principles seems 
particularly strong in the area of race. 
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 A variety of recent trends converge toward the Medical Model.  Prosecutors are increasingly 
involved in crime prevention, including through such innovations as nuisance suits against 
owners of drug houses, anti-gang injunctions, forfeiture of organized crime assets, community 
prosecutors, and promoting specialty courts, for example, drug courts.451 Prosecutors are also 
increasingly involved in minimizing the harm that they and the police do in investigating and 
prosecuting crime. Thus new ABA Standards regulate prosecutor behavior where prosecutors 
investigate, and not merely prosecute, crime.452 These standards seek to minimize informant 
abuse, limit undue use of wiretaps, reduce privacy invasions, and avoid a host of other harms.  
Prosecutors have likewise played pivotal roles in improving procedures, such as eyewitness 
identifications and interrogations, that have raised undue risks of convicting the innocent.453 In 
doing so, prosecutors have implicitly recognized that they must take into account the workings of 
the subconscious mind and of institutional forces and practices in creating these risks, for these 
reforms rely heavily on social science research on just these sorts of unconscious processes.454 
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Prosecutors have played a part in efforts to create or expand Criminal Justice Coordinating 
Councils and related reforms to focus on or include reducing racial bias, a mission that is a 
subset of an easily-expanded broader mission of focusing on the system’s contribution to 
generating racial disesteem.455 These trends converge on an implicit recognition of a broader 
prosecutorial social role in preventing and healing harm to the Body Politic. But this role is 
parallel to and supplementary to the prosecutors’ adversarial role.  The two prosecutorial 
functions—generating only justified disesteem on individuals in individual cases and helping to 
heal the Body Politic via more general reforms—are conceptually distinct, though each may 
impact the other. In the area of race, both Modified Due Process Adversarialism and the Medical 
Model must hold sway in their respective spheres. 
 C. But What Can The Prosecutor Do? 
  Here I will be very brief because I have provided details for how prosecutors can address 
an analogous problem in a similar fashion in an earlier work.456 New ethics rules would likely 
generally be ignored; would, for political reasons, probably be aspirational anyway; and, if 
somehow enforced, might inflict punishments on prosecutors trying in good faith to deal with a 
difficult and elusive problem.457 Yet, without ethical rules rigidly enforced, many might fear that 
calls to end prosecutorial contributions to the imposition of racial disesteem will be but more 
Law Day rhetoric, sound without fury. 
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 Yet there is a third way: use transparency and principles of deliberate institutional design to 
encouraged continuing, widespread, aggressive prosecutor efforts to do what is right.458 For 
reasons explained elsewhere, the best sort of approach is two-stage deliberation: internal and 
external.459 Internally, a high-level prosecutor might be given primary responsibility for 
collecting and analyzing relevant empirical data and best practices, consulting with defense 
counsel, the judiciary, and the local community and chairing a committee of prosecutors 
designed to craft both policies and training programs to reduce prosecutors’ contributions to 
racial disesteem.460 Externally, local Criminal Justice Racial Coordinating Councils having 
representatives from all stakeholder groups, including prosecutors, should be created to collect 
data, pursue complaints, exchange information, and foster ideas.461 Prosecutors would need to be 
forthcoming about the outcomes of their internal efforts and where they see need for 
improvement. Public accountability, broad two-step deliberation, and, once the public story is 
told, perhaps even coalitional electoral politics create institutional incentives for creative, 
collaborative prosecutorial reform efforts involving the community in efforts to minimize racial 
disesteem.462 Had such procedures been in place, perhaps Reed Walters may at least have 
paused, widely consulted, and worried through the racial impacts of his handling of the Jena 6. 
Had he done so, I suspect the chances of a more sensible resolution, and of community healing 
rather than enhanced pain, would have been much improved. 
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